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ABSTRACT 
EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
STRATEGIES FOR EXISTING TOLL ROADS:  
 
TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
FEBRUARY 2010 
CHRISTOPHER J. AHMADJIAN, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
M.B.A., CLARK UNIVERSITY 
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor John Collura 
Many claim that, with regard to transportation infrastructure, only partnerships 
between public and private entities, which draw on the strengths of both, can achieve the 
goals of enhancing operational efficiency, increasing service delivery, improving asset 
maintenance, and stretching scarce federal, state, and local tax dollars.  While some 
completed public-private partnership (P3) agreements on existing toll roads in the United 
States have seen a measure of success, others have raised critical questions pertaining to 
the true costs and benefits associated with these agreements for all stakeholders.  Of 
particular concern is an apparent reliance on monetary calculations alone to determine 
toll road lump sum value.  This primary focus on monetary considerations appears to 
neglect a number of non-monetary variables associated with potential costs and benefits.   
Four distinct groups of variables to consider in the decision process are presented 
in the dissertation: Monetary, Monetizable, Quantitative, and Qualitative.  The last two 
groups represent variables of a non-monetary nature, which can reflect the much larger 
stewardship role that government plays in our society.  
The objectives of this research are twofold: to formulate a conceptual framework 
for a decision support system (DSS); and to propose an approach, including a set of 
analytical methods, that assesses the costs, benefits and other impacts associated with 
alternative P3 strategies.  The primary user of the conceptual framework is identified as 
the public sector decision maker who has been asked to make recommendations 
regarding different strategies of toll road operation.  Two analytical methods are 
presented.  The first uses cash flow diagrams to calculate the net present value (NPV) for 
each of three core P3 strategies.  The second, weighs the relative importance of 
quantitative and qualitative (non-monetizable) variables.  When used as part of a seven-
step process, these two analytical methods help create a decision support system 
framework that provides stakeholders with a more complete analysis of the costs and 
benefits associated with the P3 toll road decision process.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Existing Agreements in the United States – Monetary Considerations 
 
A number of existing toll roads in the United States have considered or actually 
entered into P3 concession agreements.  The largest three (from a monetary standpoint) 
are the Chicago Skyway, the Indiana Toll Road and the Pennsylvania Turnpike.  Both 
Chicago and Indiana have entered into P3 concession agreements and the Pennsylvania 
concession agreement was signed by the Governor, but not ratified by the Pennsylvania 
legislature.  The analyses conducted for all three of the negotiated agreements appear to 
have strongly focused on monetary considerations alone.  The reason was likely a short-
term objective of the public sector aimed at maximizing the toll road’s net present value 
in an attempt to maximize the lump sum payment offered by a private concessionaire.  
The strong monetary focus seen in these agreements has only increased in other 
more recent P3 decision processes through the incorporation of Availability Payments 
(Federal Highway Administration) (AECOM CONSULT TEAM).  The availability 
payment mechanism guarantees to the concessionaire that if future revenue (or traffic 
demand) drops below a chosen minimum level, the concessionaire will receive a payment 
for any associated revenue shortfall. 
 These payments shift future revenue uncertainty that had been previously 
assumed by the private sector concessionaire and to the public sector lessee. By reducing 
uncertainty, availability payments should, theoretically, even further increase the size of 
lump sum payments offered for existing toll roads.   
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1.2 Moving Beyond Monetary Considerations 
 
An assumption is made in this paper that maximizing toll road net present value to 
increase lump sum payment is a short-term objective and that this objective is driven by a 
need, dire in some cases, for immediate cash flow.  However, even that immediate need 
does not erase the danger such short-term objectives can pose to the public interest. 
  A well-balanced decision process considers and weighs the influences of both 
short- and long-term objectives.  In the case of P3 toll roads, these long-term objectives 
are important, because they typically embrace the larger and potentially less tangible 
needs of citizens and society.  In order to incorporate long-term objectives into the 
conceptual framework that this dissertation proposes, several steps were required.  
Strategic options were defined, as were both monetary and non-monetary variables.  
Analytical methods were then developed for both types of variables.  
A difficult question contemplated during development of the analytical methods 
was to what degree could variables of a non-monetary nature be converted into dollars?  
To what degree can such variables be monetized?  For those who argue that all variables 
can, in some way, be converted into monetary terms, analysis becomes straightforward 
calculation once all variables are monetized.  However, for others, questions arise with 
regard to the validity or relevance of some of the assumptions needed to assign monetary 
values to less measurable or tangible variables. 
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 For instance, how does one assign monetary value to the inherent perception that 
government should be responsible for toll road operation?  Recognizing that not all 
variables could be assigned monetary value within a level of confidence acceptable to the 
decision maker, led to the development of a separate non-monetizable analytical method 
for these variables.  
 
1.3 Stakeholders  
The various stakeholders involved in P3 toll road agreements were also 
considered.  These stakeholders include the elected officials considering a P3 decision, 
corporations bidding to acquire the right to operate the toll road, public agencies 
operating existing toll roads, users of the roadway, and the general public. 
When formulating a framework, the interests or motives of each stakeholder must 
be considered.   For instance, if the intended user of the framework were the corporation 
or consortium acquiring the right to operate the toll road, then profit or the reliability of 
profit from year to year may be the primary objective.  Monetary issues rather than 
qualitative or other non-monetary issues may be most important.  However, if the user of 
the framework is an elected official, the public agency operating the toll road, toll road 
users or the public, then non-monetary or qualitative issues may be most important. 
The conceptual framework developed as a result of this research identified the 
primary user of that framework as the high level public sector employee or political 
staffer who has been given the task of evaluating strategic options for a given toll road 
asset.  Using the above list, the stakeholders being considered are then, the Governor or 
Mayor, the Public Agency operating the toll road and the Public.  The corporations 
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bidding to acquire the right to operate the toll road are not considered users of the 
framework.  Theses stakeholders are assumed to already have access to a set of experts 
and consultants who can analyze their interests.  
1.4 Problem Statement 
 
Since the 1990’s, P3 strategies have been touted as a new method by which 
governments can maximize the monetary value of infrastructure assets while at the same 
time continuing to provide essential public services.  P3 advocates state that the problem 
is not simply one of crumbling assets, but the more fundamental failure of governments 
to maximize each asset’s potential.  The perception is that such maximization cannot be 
achieved by government agencies working alone; the added strengths of the private sector 
are required. 
These advocates claim that only partnerships between public and private entities, 
which draw on the strengths of both, can achieve the goals of enhancing operational 
efficiency, increasing service delivery, improving asset maintenance, and stretching 
scarce federal, state, and local tax dollars. 
While some completed P3 agreements on existing toll roads in the United States 
have seen a measure of success, others have raised critical questions pertaining to the true 
costs and benefits associated with these agreements for all stakeholders.  Complicating 
matters is that the stakeholders need to choose between multiple, often mutually 
exclusive P3 strategies, each of which may have associated with them, a unique set of 
costs and benefits. 
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The premise of this research is that the net value of each P3 strategy can only be 
reliably determined when all of the costs and benefits (both monetary and non-monetary) 
associated each of the strategies is understood and systematically evaluated.  Only then 
can asset maximization be effectively considered and assessed.  
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
The objective of this dissertation is twofold: 1) to formulate a conceptual 
framework for a decision support system (DSS) designed to assist P3 stakeholders in 
considering alternative P3 strategies for an existing toll road or other highway; and 2) to 
propose an approach, including a set of analytical methods required in such a DSS, to 
assess the benefits and costs associated with the alternative P3 strategies.  Central to the 
achievement of this objective, will be the identification and estimation of the benefits and 
costs associated with each of the P3 strategies so that the net benefit of each P3 
alternative can be evaluated.   
  
   6 
CHAPTER 2 
ISSUES, CONCEPTS, EXPERIENCES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND THE 
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF THIS RESEARCH  
2.1 Background 
 
Chapter 2 includes a review and synthesis of literature on the principles and 
concepts associated with public-private partnerships (P3) being considered for public 
infrastructure assets in the United States and abroad.  A special effort was made to 
identify and critique P3 initiatives on existing toll roads within the United States.  Of 
particular interest are the “big three” lump sum concession agreements, which include the 
Chicago Skyway, the Indiana Toll Road and the Pennsylvania Turnpike.  Each provided 
the seller with a lump sum payment in exchange for the “quiet possession and 
enjoyment” of the asset for 99 years in the Chicago Skyway lease and 75 years in both 
the Indiana Toll Road and Pennsylvania Turnpike leases.  “Quiet possession and 
enjoyment” refers to the seller’s agreement to allow the buyer to operate the toll road 
without interference.  These three efforts have defined the infancy of P3 concession 
agreements in the United States.  
Decision support systems (DSS) were also investigated with particular emphasis 
placed on those that were developed to assist in making transportation investment 
decisions.  The literature reviewed included government publications, technical papers 
and other available information (both popular and academic citations).  The popular press 
citations were necessary, because many of the decisions made to date have both political 
and public perception components.  Included in the search were the TRIS database, TRB 
database, and the Google search engine.  The following keywords were used: 
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• Public Private Partnerships  
• P3  
• PPP 
• Transportation Policy  
• Decision Support Systems 
• DSS 
• Decision Theory 
• Public Financing  
• Concession Decision  
• Concession 
• Privatization 
• Public Policy Private 
• Demand Modeling 
 
 The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) web site provided both information 
and documents that were helpful, as well as links to partners with useful information on 
the P3 process.  National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) studies 
gave insight into the current state of the industry and the demand modeling processes 
used for toll road initiatives. 
 The result of the literature synthesis was a finding that although considerable 
research has been done on the contractual form and monetary (lump sum) result of P3 
agreements, there has been little to no research oriented toward the problem as stated. 
 
2.2 Public-Private Partnership Concepts  
The FHWA User Guidebook on Implementing Public-Private Partnerships for 
Transportation Infrastructure Projects in the United States defines a public-private 
partnership as follows: “A public-private partnership is a contractual agreement formed 
between public and private sector partners, which allows more private sector participation 
than is traditional.  The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting 
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with a private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility 
or system.  While the public sector usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the 
private party will be given additional decision rights in determining how the project or 
task will be completed.” (AECOM CONSULT TEAM) 
The User Guidebook also gives 16 discrete types of P3’s with the degree of 
private sector responsibility ranging from high to low.  They are: 
1. Asset Sale 
2. Full Service Long-Term Concession or Lease 
3. Multimodal Agreement (Public – Public Partnership) 
4. Joint Development Agreement (JDA – pre-development) 
5. Transit – Oriented Development (TOD – post-development) 
6. Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
7. Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) 
8. Build – Transfer – Operate (BTO) 
9. Build – Operate – Transfer (BOT) 
10. Design – Build –Finance – Operate (DBFO) 
11. Design – Build – Operate – Maintain (DBOM) 
12. Design – Build with Warranty (DB – W) 
13. Design – Build (DB) 
14. Construction Manager at Risk (CM@Risk) 
15. Contract Maintenance 
16. Fee-Based Contract Services 
The two levels directly considered in this research are those of Asset Sale and Full 
Service Long-Term Concession or Lease.  These two highest levels are fundamentally 
different from the other 14 levels below them, in that they embrace the ideology that the 
private sector will more efficiently maintain and operate roadway assets.  They further 
adhere to the proposition that any public sector oversight will impede private sector 
innovation and efficiency.  The public sector is said to benefit from these forms of P3, 
because the lump sum or other payment made will increase the overall amount of 
transportation funds available for other projects.    
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If true, then these agreements might represent a new paradigm that offers higher 
efficiency and greater funding available for projects.  The question that has not been 
answered is, How does a public sector manager determine the costs and benefits 
associated with this type of agreement?  The private sector appears to be very good at 
determining the monetary costs and benefits to them, but the public sector does not have 
the tools needed to determine what their total costs and benefits are from such 
agreements.  The costs and benefits analyzed must include more than simply those of a 
monetary nature; if a true picture of the agreements is to be gained, they must also 
include non-monetary (qualitative) variables. 
 
2.3 Funding and Ideology  
Key issues relate to both funding and ideology.  With regard to funding, in 2008 
and 2009 the United States Highway Trust Fund was, for the first time, unable to fully 
fund obligated highway spending.  Two legislative bailouts were required to close these 
funding gaps and although the size of the bailouts paled in comparison to the size of 
bailouts given to the financial sector in 2008, the events were nonetheless unprecedented.  
The immediate question is, How should the country continue to finance the 
maintenance and operation of transportation infrastructure?  This question is not new; 
similar discussions of funding and ideology occurred during the creation of National 
Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956.  The questions asked then did not center 
on whether we could build the interstate highway system, but rather if we as a society 
could find the necessary mechanisms required to pay not only for the initial capital costs, 
but also for the long-term maintenance and operational costs.  The solution found at that 
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time was fairly simple; a gas tax was passed, which provided funding for the newly 
formed United States Highway Trust Fund.  That fund has worked fairly well for more 
than 50 years, but for the Highway Trust Fund to remain a viable funding mechanism; the 
gas tax charged must keep pace with necessary expenditures.  
An alternative solution may be rooted in the implementation of new technologies.  
Electronic tolling systems have reached a point where, for the first time, the concept of a 
widespread user fee structure is feasible.  Users can now be charged a tax or fee for their 
actual vehicle miles travelled (VMT).  The cost can be varied based on time, location or 
any number of other variables.  Whether such a system could replace tolls or the gas tax 
is not yet clear.  Too many issues concerning policy and privacy still exist.  A more likely 
result, at least for the short-term, is that VMT will become another tool in the necessary 
mix of taxes, tolls and fees.  
Ideology is the second key issue.  Consider the question “What function does our 
transportation (roadway) infrastructure play in our society?  Then consider the following 
three answers. 
 
• Transportation Infrastructure is a public service for all to use without direct user 
fee.  With the exception of toll roads, this is the structure in place now.  The 
service is provided primarily by government agencies and funded by taxes.   
• Transportation Infrastructure is a public utility similar to water, sewer and 
electricity.  In this instance, the service would be provided by state mandated 
monopolies.  User fees would be regulated and overseen by the government. 
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• Transportation Infrastructure is an asset that should be sold to the private sector.  
If so, the owner would then be given the quiet possession and enjoyment of the 
asset so that the free market could prevail.  The perception is that these assets 
would be more efficiently operated and maintained by the private sector.  
Although the previous administration strongly believed in the power of the free 
market, questions of equity have not been addressed and promises of efficiency have not 
been proven.  What the new administration’s ideology will be is unknown, but given the 
size of the funding problems being faced, some form of P3 will likely have a role in the 
management, operation and funding of transportation projects. 
 
2.4 P3 Toll Road Experiences in Other Countries  
Other countries have experience with P3 agreements, however much of that 
experience is in greenfield (new construction toll road) agreements.  Malaysia, for 
example, has been using P3 agreements to expand its roadway system for more than 20 
years.  Australia, Singapore, Portugal and Spain also used greenfield P3 toll road 
agreements to expand their roadway systems.  The number of existing toll facilities that 
have been transferred to P3 concession agreement are fewer.  Both France and Canada 
have such brownfield (existing toll road) P3 agreements.    Canada provides the closest 
example to the United States.  The country has leased the Toronto 407 Express Toll Road 
to a private concessionaire for a period of 99 years.  
A number of issues stand out when looking at other countries.  First is the issue of 
available capital.  The United States is one of the few countries with a municipal bond 
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market that is able to supply a large amount of capital to public sector investors at a rate 
lower than that available to private sector investors.  Until recently, that market was able 
to supply all of the capital needed for infrastructure projects.  However, recent limitations 
are creating interest in private sector financing through the use of P3 lease agreements.  
Countries lacking municipal bonding mechanisms have always needed to rely on private 
sector investment and as a result have more experience with private sector financing and 
P3’s. 
The second issue is corruption and political influence.  Malaysia has been dealing 
with accusations of corruption and cronyism, which in several instances expanded the toll 
road system into less populated, low demand areas.  Although, the idea was that the 
improved infrastructure would “boot-strap” the local economies, so far that has not 
turned out to be the case and the projects are failing financially.  The roads are little 
traveled. 
Third are issues of social equity.  In France, concessionaires are subjected to a set 
of requirements, beyond that of competitive bidding based simply on the lump sum 
offered and the ability to pay that lump sum.  The contractor must show how their plan 
will advance the needs of society.  In addition, shadow tolls (availability payments) and 
other mechanisms are used to compensate concessionaires for lower revenues required to 
offset inequities that might be experienced by lower income users of the system. 
The United States market appears to be different from the rest of the world in 
several ways.  First is the potential size of the US market with regard to existing toll 
roads.  These existing systems are appealing, because demand is assumed to be inelastic 
even over the long-term.  
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Second is the current political environment.  Toll revenue collected on public 
systems is arguably far below that needed for yearly operating and capital costs. At the 
same time, gasoline and other taxes have also been kept primarily steady.  Over time, the 
lack of funds has led to both deterioration of the asset and a reliance on long-term debt 
instruments to fund rehabilitation efforts.  In some instances, even operating costs have 
been funded with long-term debt instruments.  This reliance on debt financing has 
reached a point where yearly debt service obligations could potentially absorb all 
available yearly revenue.  The only apparent option remaining is to generate large lump 
sums of cash through P3 concession agreements. 
More study of the rest of the world could be fruitful to determine the path the 
United States should take with regard to this type of investment or concession agreement.  
However, the structure, current political landscape, size and potentially ingrained 
perception that road systems should be free from direct user fees will likely make the 
United States environment quite different from the rest of the world. 
 
2.5 A Review of the “Big Three” United States P3 Concession Agreements   
In 2005, the City of Chicago leased the Chicago Skyway for a term of 99 years to 
the highest bidder (Cintra & Macquarie) in exchange for a one-time wire transfer of 
$1.87 billion.  In 2006, Indiana leased the Indiana Toll Road to the same company for 
$3.84 billion and a term of 75 years.  In 2008, Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell 
signed a concession agreement to lease the Pennsylvania Turnpike to Abertis for a lump 
sum payment of $12.8 billion for 75 years; however, the agreement was never ratified by 
the Pennsylvania legislature and is now defunct. 
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2.5.1 Pennsylvania Turnpike  
The Pennsylvania Turnpike consists of three sections:  the east/west mainline, 
which is 359 miles long; the north/south extension, which is 110 miles in length; and the 
western expansion, which includes a number of shorter roadways totaling 61.5 miles.  In 
2007, traffic volumes on the roadway were 87% passenger cars and 13% trucks and 
buses; the revenue split from that volume was, however, 56% from passenger cars and 
44% from trucks and buses.  The 2007 annual daily traffic volume was reported as 
185,423 vehicles. The Turnpike had 2,240 employees in that year (Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission 2). 
The signed turnpike concession agreement was for a 75-year term.  The lump sum 
dollar offered by the winning bidder was $12.8 billion.  The agreement was 686 pages 
long, with the first 132 pages consisting of primarily the legal aspects of the concession.  
The remaining 554 pages were very detailed operating terms and conditions 
(Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 2).  There was no mention of concerns over 
diversion to I-80.  The agreement replaced the existing authority with a quite similar 
organization during the concession term.   
The concessionaire was required to meet all prevailing wage, procurement, and 
other regulatory requirements.  Existing union employees were offered positions under 
the same conditions as those contained in their collective bargaining agreement.  Once 
that agreement expired, the union was to negotiate directly with the concessionaire, who 
was contractually required to assume the pension liability for all retirees.  While 
Governor Edward Rendell signed the Pennsylvania Toll Road concession agreement, 
legislative approval for the agreement was never gained. 
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2.5.2 Indiana Toll Road  
The Indiana East-West Toll Road (ITR), which was opened in 1956, extends from 
the Ohio Turnpike in the east to the Chicago Skyway in the west.  The toll road is 156 
miles in length and alternates between four and six lanes.  At present, tolls are collected 
with a closed ticket system for the easternmost 133 miles and a barrier system for the 
remaining 24 miles (Macquarie Infrastructure Group).  In 2005, the traffic mix on the 
ITR was approximately 82% passenger cars and 18% commercial vehicles, but income 
from commercial vehicles amounted to about 61% of the total revenue (Crowe Chizek 
and Company LLC.). 
 The Indiana Toll Road was leased, in 2006, to the ITR Concession Company, 
LLC (ITRCC) from the Indiana Finance Authority (IFA) for $3.8 billion and 75 years 
(Indiana Finance Authority).  The concession is a partnership between Cintra 
Concesiones de Infraestructureas de Transporte S.A. (Cintra), a Spanish toll road builder, 
and the Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG), an Australian investment bank 
(Macquarie Infrastructure Group). 
 The lease agreement provides for yearly toll increases that are at a minimum 2% 
and at a maximum the greater of the annual consumer price index (CPI) percentage or the 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP) percentage for the year.  A summary of 
scheduled toll rates over the lease period is shown in Table 2-4.  Note that the toll rates 
given in Table 2-4 are calculated using the minimum 2% yearly rate of increase.   
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The ITRCC also has several important rights under the agreement.  First, the 
ITRCC has the right to refinance its investment in the toll road, at will.  This right is 
thought to have proved very lucrative for Macquarie and Cintra in the Chicago Skyway 
agreement.  Second, the IFA is required to compensate the concessionaire if 20 or more 
miles of continuous competing roadways is built within 10 miles of the Indiana toll road.  
A competing roadway is defined as one of comparable design (built to 
freeway/expressway standards).  This requirement could become a concern if levels of 
service were to drop significantly on the toll road during the life of the agreement.  
Finally, the agreement can only be terminated by default of the ITRCC (Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission 2).  The IFA cannot terminate the agreement. 
 
2.5.3 Chicago Skyway  
The 7.8-mile Chicago Skyway was built in 1958.  Consisting of six travel lanes, 
the roadway’s most striking feature is the Calumet River Bridge.  Until the concession 
agreement, the Skyway was operated by the Chicago Streets and Sanitation Department.  
The Illinois Toll Highway Authority operates all other toll highways in Illinois.  The 
Skyway connects the east end of the Indiana Toll Road to the west end of the Dan Ryan 
Expressway, which is I-90.  
 The Skyway was signed as part of I-90 until 1999, when the City of Chicago 
discovered that official notification from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), 
that the Skyway was part of the federal highway system, had never been received.  The 
city quickly changed all signage to read “TO I-90” (Samuel) (Heartland Institute). 
 The realization that the Skyway was not officially part of the interstate system 
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may have been what set the stage for the lease of the roadway.  The Calumet River 
Bridge was rehabilitated after structural inspection and analysis found corrosion, 
members with below-standard load ratings, and warping of truss components due to 
inadequate sealing.  Almost immediately after the completion of rehabilitation work, the 
City of Chicago asked for bids to lease the Skyway to a private vendor (City of Chicago).  
The winning bidder was the Skyway Concession Company, a consortium between Cintra 
and the Macquarie Infrastructure Group.  The agreement is a 99-year lease of the 
roadway for a lump sum payment of $1.83 billion.  The deal was made official on 
January 24, 2005, when the City of Chicago announced that $1.83 billion had been wire 
transferred to the city by the Skyway Concession Company, LLC. 
 
2.6 Key Issues  
2.6.1 Stakeholder Perspectives  
The first and potentially most important stakeholder is the governor or mayor.  As 
the leader of the city or state, he or she will have an important influence on the final 
decision to enter into a concession agreement.  In Pennsylvania, for example, Governor 
Edward Rendell, after legislative approval, signed Act 44 into law.  He then proceeded to 
sign a concession agreement with Abertis, which was in direct conflict with the Act 44 
legislation.  Legislative approval of that concession agreement was never achieved.  
  The second stakeholder is the corporation or corporations acquiring the right to 
operate the toll road.  Their primary interests are in the maximization of profit and the 
reduction of uncertainty with regard to future revenue and costs.  With regard to profit, a 
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toll schedule with significant potential for toll increases will result in better revenue 
opportunities for the concessionaire and is therefore a priority.  The use of conservative 
demand assumptions allows for calculation of the lowest lump sum price and additional 
profit if demand is higher than that assumed during negotiation.  
On the other hand, reducing uncertainty does require that revenue goals be 
constrained.  For instance, too high a toll schedule or too aggressive a non-competitive 
agreement might turn public opinion against the concessionaire and directly impact 
revenue and/or costs.  In an extreme case, the concessionaire might even be relieved of 
their responsibilities under the P3 agreement (Buxbaum, Ortiz and Little, Protecting the 
Public Interest: The Role of Long-Term Concession Agreements for Providing 
Transportation Infrastructure).  
The third stakeholder is the public agency operating the existing toll road.  An 
example is that of a turnpike authority, whose interest may simply be in maintaining its 
current status as a government agency or authority.  This interest can lead to the 
development of an alternative such as Act 44 in Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania Department 
of Transportation 1).  In that case, when faced with the possibility of a concession 
agreement, the Authority worked with the governor and legislature to write and pass an 
alternative approach.  Act 44 showed that by increasing tolls on an annual basis and 
adding tolls to I-80, the Turnpike could deliver as much value to the state as the 
negotiated P3 concession agreement. Note that since Act 44 provides a yearly annuity 
payment, benefits accrue over time and do not provide the initial lump sum payment 
promised by a concession deal. 
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 The fourth stakeholders are the users of the roadway: operators of commercial 
vehicles and passenger cars.  Although commercial vehicle operators typically comprise a 
much smaller percentage of total traffic than do passenger cars, they contribute a 
disproportionately higher rate in terms of the revenue collected.  All users are interested 
in high-quality toll road service at the lowest possible toll rate. 
The fifth and final stakeholders are the general public, who can also be users of 
the roadway and have the same user interests as described above, but who are just as 
likely not to use the roadway.  In that instance, they are likely more concerned with state 
or local debt levels, operating deficits, and other challenges.  They are often interested in 
keeping taxes low and knowing that tax revenues are spent wisely.  If a lump sum 
payment can be shown to address these non-roadway interests, then the general public 
may find such lump sum payments acceptable.  The general public is assumed to have 
enough information, of a transparent nature, to be sufficiently informed about such public 
infrastructure decisions.  
 
2.6.2 Asset Monetization  
Monetization is a term used for the act of converting an asset into dollars. In the 
case of P3 agreements, monetization can be thought of in degrees, which are linked to the 
16 types of P3’s listed on page 10.  Applying the FHWA scale to the concept of 
monetization, the highest level of monetization would then be achieved with the sale of 
an asset in which no conditions are attached to the sale.  Theoretically, that lack of 
restriction would maximize potential private sector profit and, unless private sector 
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uncertainty was perceived as increased by that very lack of restriction, the lump sum 
price paid for the asset would also be maximized.   
The United States tax statute provides an alternative definition of the term “sale.”  
The statute states that if the length of a lease agreement is for a period of longer than 50 
years, the agreement can be considered a sale for tax purposes.  That status has 
importance in that the concessionaire can then depreciate the asset, which in turn lowers 
the concessionaire’s tax burden.  However, usage of the term sale in this manner 
invariably leads to a semantics discussion.  For example, should tax law dictate the 
terminology used to describe this type of agreement?   
Existing concession agreements in the United States most accurately fit within the 
Full Service Long-Term Concession or Lease category.  Each of the public organizations 
involved in these concession agreements took an asset the organization perceived as of 
little cash value in its current state and converted that asset into a large amount of cash.  
Because there are no revenue sharing or other revenue related conditions associated with 
the agreements, all future revenue streams will flow directly to the concessionaire.  
However, the public sector entities will maintain oversight of the agreement and will 
monitor numerous performance conditions for compliance.  In addition, each agreement 
has an end date, at which time the asset reverts to public sector operation.  The 
agreements do not meet the threshold of an Asset Sale. 
Whether or not this type (or level) of P3 agreement represents the most efficient 
method with which to monetize an asset remains unclear.  From the perspective of the 
public sector lessee, the term “efficient” is defined as “receiving the highest value for the 
asset while assuming the least amount of uncertainty.”  “Uncertainty” is defined as “the 
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probability that an unplanned event will occur.”  These unplanned events can be of a 
fiscal, political, economic, operational or social nature and can have a negative effect on 
either the governmental entity or private sector concessionaire.  
Some assessment of uncertainty can be gained by reviewing the method of 
payment chosen by the public sector entities (lessee).  In all three of the cases studied, the 
lump sum payment was used.  Annuity payments to the lessee and revenue sharing 
agreements were also options; however, the lump sum option was chosen each time 
despite a higher potential for revenue uncertainty.  The lump sum payment does offer, not 
only a higher initial payment, but also the widest range of reinvestment options.  If 
invested effectively, the lump sum has the potential to outperform the annuity or revenue 
sharing options.  In addition, in a single day, the lump sum option can provide a 
government entity with enough funds to quickly make a difference in their jurisdiction.  
Is the lump sum payment then the most efficient choice?  The public sector decision 
maker needs to look closely at all payment options to insure -- as much as possible -- that 
the most efficient P3 method is being chosen for each specific asset. 
 Pennsylvania actually developed two alternatives for the Pennsylvania Turnpike.  
The first is the concession agreement outlined in section 2.5.1.  The second is referred to 
as Act 44, which arguably has a considerably lower level of revenue uncertainty.  The 
Act 44 legislation maintains the existing Turnpike Authority, but requires the Authority 
to make annual payments to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT).  
Under Act 44 (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 1), the Turnpike Authority is 
required to transfer a portion of toll revenue to the PennDOT.  That portion will be based 
on a sliding scale that increases payments over a 50-year period, but averages to $1.67 
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billion per year (Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 1).  The toll increases imposed on 
users are similar to those in the concession agreement with a 25% increase in 2009 and 
3% increases in each remaining year of the 50-year agreement.  One significant 
difference between this plan and the concession agreement is the addition of tolls to I-80.  
The second toll road is necessary to meet revenue requirements and is also expected to 
discourage diversion from the Turnpike to a perceived “free” alternative with respect to 
direct user fees.  
 
2.6.3 Demand Estimation  
For the purposes of this research, “estimated demand” is defined as “changes in 
travel demand, forecast by analysts, though a modeling process.”  The level to which 
these demand estimates played a significant role in the determination of the lump sum 
payment remains uncertain.  Attempts that were made to gather data on the methodology 
used to calculate demand estimates for each of the agreements were largely unsuccessful.  
An interesting term encountered when searching for data was that of “Commercially in 
Confidence.”  This phrase and other terms are used to restrict access to information on 
both financial and engineering estimates.   
Despite these restrictions, some information on the performance of demand 
estimates was found.  NCHRP Synthesis 364 (Kriger, Shiu and Naylor) presents a table 
showing the five-year performance of demand estimates for 26 recent P3 projects.  The 
most accurate estimates were within 10% of actual results.  The lowest estimate was 
17.8% below actual and the highest was 145.8% higher than actual results.  Even with 
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vast improvements in methodology, the error associated with these traditional models is 
unlikely to be within 1% of actual demand. 
The need for 1% accuracy is demonstrated by the sensitivity analysis performed 
on the Pennsylvania Turnpike Concession Agreement (Gray, Cusatis and Foote).  A 1% 
demand growth rate was used to calculate the base case, which resulted in a lump sum 
price of $15.4 billion.  When a 0% growth rate was applied, the value dropped to $10.2 
billion.  When a 2% growth rate was assumed, the lump sum price rose to $22.5 billion.  
A 1% increase in the demand assumption resulted in a $7.1 billion change in lump sum 
price.  Conversely, a 1% drop in the demand assumption resulted in a $5.2 billion 
decrease in lump sum price. 
 The most effective demand analysis may be one for which demand is simply 
assumed, rather than calculated.  In Pennsylvania, different analysts chose to use different 
demand growth rate assumptions.  For instance, the base case condition for the 
concession agreement used a demand growth rate of 1% per year (Gray, Cusatis and 
Foote).  Act 44 (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 1) used a demand growth 
rate of 2.5% per year for the first 20 years and then a 2.0% growth rate for the next 30 
years.  A Merrill Lynch review (Butler) used a 2% growth rate per year for first 25 years, 
a growth rate of 1.5% for the next 25 years and a 0% growth rate for the final 25 years.  
The reason given for the 0% in the final 25 years was capacity, which appeared to be the 
only consideration for capacity concerns in the analyses. 
A more thorough method of analysis would be to use a range of demand rates that 
are assumed and reviewed in conjunction with other variables.  For instance, the time 
needed, by a concessionaire, to pay off debt instruments can be estimated for each 
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assumed demand rate within the range chosen.  The concept behind this approach to 
demand estimating is not to predict demand per se, but to assess the probability of 
uncertainty for the range of demand levels and to then use that information to, as much as 
possible, minimize that uncertainty.  Although, the private sector is experienced with this 
type of analysis, government officials including administrators, engineers and planners 
may not have the skills required. 
A financial review of the Chicago Skyway performed by the NW Financial Group 
(Enright) provides insight into such analysis.  Their analysis calculates the lump sum 
price for a variety of both toll schedules and traffic demand increases.  Table 2-1 shows 
that for the concessionaire to breakeven, given the $1.83 billion cost of the Skyway, no 
traffic growth and an inflation rate of 3% are needed.  For a brownfield (existing toll 
road) concession, those would seem to be fairly low thresholds to meet. 
 
TABLE 2-1 Net Present Value of Chicago Skyway (Enright) 
 
Net Present Value (in billions) 
For Various Toll and Demand Increases (in percent) 
Demand / 
Toll 2% (Floor) 3% (CPI) 4% (CPI) 
5.5% 
(GDP) 7% (GDP) 
No Growth 
(0%) $1.47 $1.92 $2.60 $4.48 $8.62 
Historic 
(3.78%) $8.37 $13.08 $21.59 $49.89 $124.72 
Moderate 
(2%) $3.48 $4.93 $7.36 $14.85 $33.26 
Aggressive 
(5%) $16.63 $27.85 $48.90 $121.97 $322.38 
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Table 2-2 performs additional calculations to determine the lost transportation 
revenue that the concessionaire’s profit represents.  These amounts can be looked upon as 
the amount of return that any initial payment and reinvestment of the lump sum payment 
will need to achieve before the governmental jurisdiction breaks even.  
TABLE 2-2 Lost Transportation Funding in Chicago Skyway (Enright) 
 
Lost Transportation Funding (in billions) 
For Various Toll and Demand Increases (in percent) 
Demand / 
Toll 2% (Floor) 3% (CPI) 4% (CPI) 
5.5% 
(GDP) 7% (GDP) 
No Growth 
(0%) -$0.33 $0.12 $0.80 $2.68 $6.82 
Historic 
(3.78%) $6.98 $12.00 $21.08 $51.41 $131.84 
Moderate 
(2%) $1.68 $3.13 $5.56 $13.05 $31.46 
Aggressive 
(5%) $14.83 $26.05 $47.10 $120.17 $320.58 
 
This type of analysis, and not traditional demand models, may allow both public 
and private stakeholders to determine how best to reduce uncertainty when considering 
future P3 deals.   
 
2.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The only sensitivity analysis found investigates the Pennsylvania Turnpike 
concession agreement and is entitled “For Whom the Road Tolls” (Gray, Cusatis and 
Foote).  The analysis was conducted for the Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania 
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House of Representatives and gives insight into which variables should be considered as 
important to the decision process. 
 
TABLE 2-3 Pennsylvania Turnpike Sensitivity Analysis (Gray, Cusatis and Foote) 
 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Sensitivity Analysis (in billions) 
Assumption  Lump Sum Price 
Term of Concession 
50 years $ 15.4 billion(base case) 
75  years $ 22.6 billion 
99 years $ 26.1 billion 
Toll  Schedule 
3% per year $ 5.8 billion 
5.5% for 50 years, then 3% $ 15.4 billion(base case) 
Traffic Growth 
0% per year $ 10.2 billion 
1% per year $ 15.4 billion(base case) 
2% per year $ 22.5 billion 
Operating Savings in Year 1 
0% savings $ 15.4 billion(base case) 
10% savings $ 16.0 billion 
20% savings $ 16.6 billion 
 
2.6.4.1  Toll Schedule  
Two toll schedules were compared.  The first assumes 5.5% yearly toll increases 
for 50 years, yielding a base case lump sum price of $15.4 billion.  The second reduces 
these toll increases to three percent each year for fifty years, which results in the lump 
sum price dropping to $5.8 billion.  A 2.5% reduction in the yearly toll increase resulted 
in a $9.6 billion decrease in lump sum price.   
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2.6.4.2  Term of Concession  
Three terms of concession were also analyzed.  The 50-year base case lump sum 
price was $15.4 billion.  An increase in length to 75 years increased the lump sum price 
to $22.6 billion, and an increase to 99 years resulted in $26.1 billion.  The increase from 
50 to 75 years, then, increased the lump sum price by $7.2 billion. 
 
2.6.4.3  Operational Savings  
The base case assumes zero cost savings in the first year based on increases in 
operational efficiency. Only the first year is considered.  A 10% savings increases the 
lump sum price by $0.6 billion and a 20% savings increases the lump sum price by an 
additional $0.6 billion.  These increases appear relatively small when compared with the 
$7.1 billion increase that resulted from a 1% increase in traffic growth, which suggests 
that operating costs are not as important as other factors.    
 
2.6.4.4  Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization   
Two metrics available for comparing operating costs between years or for 
different facilities are the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBIDTA) divided by gross revenue and the EBIDTA Margin.  Both metrics can give 
some indication as to the health of the toll road organization.   
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The EBIDTA divided by gross revenue represents the reported percentage of 
gross revenue spent on operations.  Subtracting the EBIDTA divided gross revenue from 
100 gives the EBIDTA Margin, a measure of the gross revenue available after operating 
expenses.  The EBIDTA Margins for each of the three agreements are given below.   
For the 2005 financial year, the EBIDTA Margin for the Indiana Toll Road was 
reported as 63.3% (Macquarie Infrastructure Group); the EBIDTA divided by gross 
revenue was 36.7%.  This is the percentage of revenue needed for operations.  The 2006 
EBIDTA Margin for the Chicago Skyway was 73.9% (Florian) and the EBIDTA divided 
by gross revenue was 26.1%.  The Pennsylvania Turnpike Authority reported their 
EBIDTA divided by gross revenue as 38% (Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 3).   
These EBIDTA estimates suggest that the Chicago Skyway uses the smallest 
percentage of revenue for operations.  That statement could mean a greater efficiency of 
operation and lower operating cost, or that the toll rate is higher in relation to the cost of 
operation.  Given equal operating costs, the toll road with higher revenue will have the 
lower EBITDA. 
Caution must be exercised when relying on these metrics or other similar metrics, 
because the inputs used to calculate EBIDTA can vary.  In this case, given that the assets 
are all brownfield (existing) toll roads and therefore similar in nature, there should be a 
basis for comparison.  A strong reason to use the metric is the financial community's 
tendency to use EBITDA as a measure of organizational health.  Also, given the 
limitations on available data, EBIDTA may be one of the few metrics available for 
comparison.  
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2.6.5 Revenue Forecasting  
For all three agreements, the key variable associated with revenue forecasting was 
the toll schedule.  However, before discussing toll schedules, demand estimation must be 
revisited briefly.  In the short term, traffic demand is difficult to separate from toll 
revenue given that traffic demand multiplied by toll schedule yields toll revenue.  
However, in the long term of 20, 30, 50, 75, and even 99 years, traffic demand becomes 
very difficult to estimate in any relevant manner.  In these instances, demand must be 
separated from toll schedule, and treated as a source of uncertainty, rather than a variable 
to be estimated.   
A “floor rate” (minimum) yearly rate increase in toll schedule has been used to 
reduce toll revenue uncertainty by guaranteeing the concessionaire a minimum yearly 
increase in toll schedule.  Larger rate increases have also been allowed and were 
determined by the CPI (Consumer Price Index) or GDP (Gross Domestic Product).  Such 
increases seem reasonable given the potential for equivalent inflationary increases in 
operating costs.  Increases in profit must then come only from increased demand and 
increased efficiency of operation.  Given that these are the intended outcomes of such 
agreements, there should be no problems.  Nevertheless, there are user and public 
perception issues to consider.  These are rate increases never seen before by users.  Just 
the yearly nature of the increases will be new to users.  How these increases will impact 
issues such as the real income of users, demand elasticity and the economic health of the 
region must be considered.   
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 For the concessionaire, negotiating the highest possible rate of toll increase was 
likely the most important variable considered in order to both maximize the potential for 
profit and to reduce revenue uncertainty as much as possible.  Tying the rate of toll 
increases to both a floor value and some measure of inflation will likely serve well to 
maximize profit even in the face of traffic demand fluctuations.   
Less certain is if the negotiated toll increases effectively reduced public sector 
revenue uncertainty in the future.  Should demand increase steeply, all additional 
revenues generated above the values assumed remain with the concessionaire.  Any 
resulting losses in revenue will also remain with the concessionaire, but given the 
structure of the agreements and the low thresholds that must be met to break even, the 
probability of loss appears to be considerably lower than the probability of gain. 
Table 2-4 presents the minimum toll increases for the three agreements, which are 
calculated using the floor values given in the agreements.  Increases above these 
minimum values will result in higher concession profit.  The table is shown simply to 
illustrate the proposed increases as dollars and not just as a single percentage.  Note that 
just 10 years out, the rate for a 5-axle vehicle on the Pennsylvania turnpike will increase 
to $84.30, which is a 156% increase over the initial $54.00 price. 
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TABLE 2-4 Toll Schedules for All Agreements (Macquarie Infrastructure Group) 
(Gray, Cusatis and Foote) (Florian) 
 
Toll Schedule for Concession Period 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Year 2 Axle 5 Axle 8 Axle 
2008 $22.75 $54.00 $809.00 
2010 $29.15 $69.19 $1,011.25 
2012 $30.63 $72.69 $1,089.01 
2014 $32.18 $76.37 $1,44.14 
2016 $33.81 $80.24 $1,202.06 
2018 $35.52 $84.30 $1,262.91 
2020 $37.31 $88.57 $1,326.85 
2040 $61.14 $145.12 $2,174.19 
2060 $113.35 $237.80 $3,562.67 
2075 $145.10 $344.51 $5,159.81 
Indiana Toll Road 
Year 2 Axle 5 Axle 7 Axle 
2011 $8.01 $31.87 $69.55 
2021 $9.76 $38.85 $84.78 
2031 $11.90 $47.36 $103.35 
2041 $14.50 $57.73 $125.98 
2051 $17.68 $70.37 $153.57 
2061 $21.55 $85.78 $187.20 
2071 $26.27 $104.57 $228.20 
2081 $32.02 $127.47 $278.17 
Chicago Skyway 
Year 2 Axle 5 Axle  
2009 $3.00 $12.60 N/A 
2017 $5.00 $20.60 N/A 
2027 $6.09 $25.11 N/A 
2037 $7.43 $30.61 N/A 
2047 $9.06 $37.31 N/A 
2057 $11.04 $46.40 N/A 
2067 $13.46 $55.45 N/A 
2077 $16.41 $67.59 N/A 
2087 $20.00 $84.04 N/A 
2097 $24.38 $100.43 N/A 
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2.7 Lessons Learned   
2.7.1 Revenue Forecasting and Cost Estimates  
 In United States concession agreements, demand models and cost estimates seem 
to have had little to do with the agreed upon lump sum payment.  Instead, the payment 
offered appears to have been based on the toll schedule negotiated and the assumptions 
made with regard to changes in demand.  Given the impossibility of accurately 
forecasting demand over a 50- 75- or 99-year period, aggregated assumptions were 
required.   
To some degree, the lump sum offered was likely based on what the market 
would bear.  This amount would balance how little could be offered and still be accepted 
by the government entity, and how much could be offered and still be accepted by the 
institutions providing the long-term debt and short-term equity instruments. 
Government officials and the general public do not appear to have recognized that 
traditional methods of modeling demand, which likely include an application of 
traditional four-step modeling and the classic planning process, may not apply well to 
stakeholder motives and interests, simply due to the large size of the funds being 
transferred between accounts and the long-term nature of the agreement.  Stakeholders 
may need to consider the use of demand, revenue and cost estimating techniques that are 
appropriate for this type of negotiation and not simply those that fit within their existing 
planning paradigm. 
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2.7.2 Uncertainty  
The public sector has been traditionally averse to uncertainty, while the private 
sector has typically been considered willing to assume levels of uncertainty in return for 
higher profits.  In the three P3 initiatives reviewed, the concessionaires negotiated steady 
toll increases that are indexed with inflation and used seemingly conservative demand 
growth rates that are low in historical terms.  Both of these actions appear to have 
reduced revenue uncertainty significantly. 
On the other hand, one could argue that government officials have not adequately 
protected themselves against unplanned events.  For example, concession profits above 
those planned might be driven by actual demand that is higher than travel demand 
estimates.   In the future, government officials should consider other forms of payment, 
such as revenue sharing or toll schedule modification when deciding how best to reduce 
revenue uncertainty. 
 
2.7.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
Sensitivity analysis is useful to identify important variables and the effects that 
these variables have in the determination of payments.  For example, sensitivity analysis 
was used in Pennsylvania to identify that the rate of toll increase was central in 
establishing a lump sum payment estimate.  
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2.7.4 Lump Sum Payment  
Claims have been made that the private sector will only be able to realize 
maximum earnings (defined as EBIDTA) when encumbered by as few contractual 
provisions as possible.  In other words, if the highest theoretically possible lump sum 
payment is to be achieved, the concessionaire needs to truly “have the quiet possession 
and enjoyment” (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 2) of the asset. 
Government officials need to weigh this argument along with the need to hedge 
against future potential revenue uncertainty.  If the argument against contractual 
restrictions or conditions is to be accepted, then government officials need to confirm that 
this freedom of operation is truly being compensated for within the lump sum payment. 
 
2.7.5 Stakeholders  
Government officials need to resist the inclination to simply choose the lump sum 
alternative in an attempt to generate immediate and maximum liquidity.  Lump sum 
options should be carefully compared with other payment options.  Furthermore, 
government officials need to carefully examine the motivations of all bidders.  For 
example, the concessionaires in Chicago, Indiana and Pennsylvania appear to have been 
motivated buyers who saw these deals as their entry point into an emerging market.  
Early market entry has the potential to provide a strategic advantage in future deals.  
Given that possibility, can government officials show that the lump sum payments 
reflected that advantage? 
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2.7.6 Potential Questions for future Agreements 
 
The following are questions that may be of interest to stakeholders during future P3 
negotiations. 
• What forms of compensation should be considered in addition to lump sum 
payments?  
 
• What analytical tools, in addition to sensitivity analysis, may be employed to 
assess uncertainty?  
 
• What metrics can be considered, in addition to EBIDTA, to evaluate the health of 
a toll road? 
 
• Should traditional demand modeling approaches be modified, or should other 
approaches be developed for use in P3 financial analyses? 
 
• How might stakeholders take into account the interests of both users and the 
general public? 
 
2.8 Potential Analytical Methods 
 
2.8.1 Decision Support System (DSS) Concepts  
A decision support system provides the stakeholder with a formal decision 
framework.  The DSS can guide the decision process while including all necessary 
considerations, including those that may have been previously omitted for simplicity.  
The user is to some extent relieved of the organizational or cognitive requirements 
associated with the decision process and in some cases does not need to become an expert 
before decision-making can be attempted.  The DSS in no way replaces the human in the 
equation, but instead provides scaffolding that can make the decision process more 
exhaustive and thorough.  DSS’s are widely used by the military and are gaining 
acceptance in medicine. 
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2.8.2 Net Present Value (NPV)  
Net Present Value (NPV) refers to the conversion of a future stream of revenues 
and costs into one net present value, which can then be used to determine the current 
lump sum value of any such stream of revenue and costs.  In the three United States 
examples of P3 concession that were reviewed, NPV is thought to be the primary value 
used by bidders to develop the lump sum payments offered for each brownfield (existing) 
toll road.   
To develop a NPV, the private sector bidder would calculate the revenues and 
costs expected over the life of the concession agreement.  To gain the most precise NPV 
possible, the bidder would incorporate as many monetary variables as possible into the 
NPV calculation.  Assumptions would be required for some of these variables, such as 
the discount rate, annual traffic growth and toll schedule increases.  The assumptions 
made would need to be kept as conservative (low values for traffic growth and high 
values for toll schedule and discount rate) as possible in an attempt to reduce revenue 
uncertainty.  The resulting calculations would, theoretically, give a conservative estimate 
of the profit that might be gained through the life of the concession agreement.   
The sensitivity analysis calculated for NPV of the Pennsylvania Turnpike gives 
some insight into the nature of NPV.  This sensitivity analysis is summarized in Table 2-
3.  The base case 50-year NPV for the turnpike was calculated by the public entity as 
$15.4 billion.  When the duration of the agreement was increased to 75 years, the NPV 
increased to $22.6 billion.   
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Compare these amounts with the sale price of $12.8 billion for an agreement 
duration of 75 years.  The use of the words “arguably” in the first paragraph and 
“theoretically” in the second paragraph refer to an alternative argument that cites the 
impossibility of predicting economic or societal trends and conditions with any accuracy 
over the 75- or 99-year durations of the concession agreements.  Any calculations made 
over such long periods of time would have no basis in reality and no basis for comparison 
of infrastructure assets.    
If the private sector is assumed to be shrewd or experienced and to understand the 
imprecise nature of a long-term NPV calculation, then the lump sum offered must be 
based on something other than NPV calculation alone.  Of the possible alternatives to 
NPV, those of political influence and market forces are the most likely.  Market forces 
refer to the lowest estimate of a lump sum that might still be accepted by a public sector 
entity in dire need of cash flow.    
This argument is further enhanced by the sensitivity analysis for the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike.  Table 2-3 shows that a 1% change in the assumption used for traffic growth 
results in an approximately $5 billion increase or decrease in NPV.  That level of 
sensitivity or volatility in calculation lends credence to the argument that more than NPV 
must have been used in the determination of lump sum. 
Whether lump sum was determined primarily by NPV, politics, or market forces, 
the commonality associated with all three is the private sector stakeholder’s focus on 
profit.  The assignment of a monetary net present value to the asset appears to be the 
primary goal of the private sector stakeholder with no consideration of non-monetary 
(quantitative and qualitative) variables. 
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2.8.3 Benefit/Cost Analysis   
Benefit/cost analysis is a widely accepted method of analysis for transportation 
projects.  As with NPV, benefit/cost allows the stakeholder to compare several 
alternatives with relative consistency and to determine, with relative confidence, the 
alternative that offers the largest net benefit.  Unlike NPV, benefit/cost analysis typically 
considers more than simply the monetary value of the assets, but despite the strengths of 
benefit/cost analysis, the public sector does not appear to have applied these methods to 
the analysis of P3 toll road decisions.  
 
2.8.4 Cash Flow Diagrams 
 
In his book, Better Public Transit Systems (Bruun), Eric Bruun introduces the 
concept of using a Cash Flow Diagram to examine the costs and benefits associated with a project or operation.  The cash flow diagram is a graphical representation of both costs and benefits, which are shown in dollars.  The method gives the decision maker a visually oriented method of capturing the influence of individual variables on the calculation of net present value.  Individual influences can easily be lost when simply comparing the single number representing the net present value.   
2.9 The Research Need and Contribution 
 
The need for this research is reflected in the following excerpts from 3 articles, 2 
editorials and 2 reports that capture the essence of the discussion taking place in 
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professional journals, reports and the popular press with regard to public-private 
partnership (P3) projects. 
First, a May 24, 2009 article in the New York Times entitled, “Turning the 
Infrastructure Into Profits” (Marino) discusses the private sector’s interest in public 
infrastructure assets.  The discussion centers on the potential for profit and the reliability 
of that profit. 
Second, an article in the April 2009 edition of Urbanland magazine entitled, 
“Public/Private Partnerships in Transportation” (Spivak) discusses the potential for large 
lump sum payments, but also the potential for lost future toll revenue and increased tolls 
for users.   
Third, a July 05, 2009 editorial in the Boston Globe entitled, “More Value from 
State Workers” (Parker) states that public sector workers can and do work as hard as those 
in the private sector.  The management of those agencies is what creates inefficiency.  The 
article further states that private sector organizations are not less expensive, because they 
require profit. 
Fourth, a May 20, 2009 editorial in Boston Globe entitled, “Privatization Debate” 
(Haynes) questions a legislator’s call to repeal what is commonly known as the “Pacheco 
Bill.”  The law requires that the actual cost savings of privatization be proven before any 
contracts are signed.  For P3 advocates, the concern is that given, the many unknowns 
associated with long-term P3 agreements, such savings cannot be proven and the law 
could be stifling the use of innovative alternatives.  
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Fifth, a June 5, 2009 article in the New York Times entitled, “Politics and the 
Financial Crisis Slow the Drive to Privatize” (Wayne) discusses reasons why P3 projects 
have slowed and finds that the reason is more than just the financial crisis.  The article 
points out, “Some deals turned out to be less lucrative than these would-be sellers had 
hoped.” 
Sixth, page 3 of National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 
Synthesis 391 (Buxbaum and Ortiz, Public Sector Decision Making for Public-Private 
Partnerships) states that “Future research on this subject could focus on the PPP valuation 
process and the development of a framework to assist project sponsors in the selection of 
project delivery options, including the various types of PPPs.” 
 Seventh, in its report entitled, “Transportation Finance in Massachusetts: Volume 
2, Building a Sustainable Transportation Financing System” (Massachusetts 
Transportation Finance Commission)the Massachusetts Transportation Finance 
Commission recommends, “The Executive Office of Transportation and Public Works 
(EOTPW) should utilize alternative procurement methods and public private partnerships 
(P3).” However, unlike other recommendations in the table, no anticipated cost savings 
are given.  Instead a plus symbol (+) is shown.  The + is defined as follows 
“Recommendations with this symbol are important to the overall effort to reform and 
revitalize the Massachusetts transportation system, but savings arising from their 
implementation have not been quantified.”   
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The report further recommends, “The Commonwealth should investigate whether 
public private partnerships are appropriate for the development and/or funding of our 
transportation infrastructure. ”  The + is again used, but defined somewhat differently 
“Recommendations with this symbol are important to the overall effort to reform and 
revitalize the Massachusetts transportation system, but have not been quantified, or are not 
quantifiable.” 
All of these examples consistently point to a lack of understanding and strong 
concern for the implications of P3 toll road agreements.   The contribution of the research 
lies in the creation of a conceptual decision support system or process.  No such system or 
process has been developed, which captures both the costs and benefits associated with 
existing P3 toll road organizational alternatives.  This lack of a DSS appears to have 
resulted in a reliance on monetary considerations alone.   Existing agreements appear to 
support this assertion in that they reflect a strong focus on the objective of maximizing toll 
road lump sum payment.  That is not to say monetary considerations are unimportant; 
many of the P3 toll road decision processes are driven by serious monetary concerns.  
However, focusing solely on monetary considerations neglects, or at best understates, the 
potential importance of non-monetary considerations.  
The development of a conceptual decision support system or process should lead 
to more structured decision making that shares more information and creates more 
discussion amongst all stakeholders during the decision process.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH APPROACH  
3.1 A 10-Task Research Approach  
The first research objective is “to develop a conceptual framework for a decision 
support system (DSS) designed to assist P3 stakeholders in considering alternative P3 
strategies for an existing toll road or other highway.”  To complete that objective a 10‐task research approach was used to develop and demonstrate a 7‐step (conceptual) DSS process.  Each of the 10 tasks supported the others and each concurrent step allowed for the development of the next step.   
1. Task 1 lists potential inputs and outputs for a DSS in an effort to identify key 
variables involved in such inputs and outputs. 
2. Task 2 creates a model base, which identifies potential analytical tools for use in a 
DSS process.   
3. Task 3 develops an existing knowledge base, which lists available information 
that could be used in a DSS process.   
4. Task 4 identified and defined 2 categories of P3 variables. 
5. Task 5 identifies and defines three “core” P3 organizational alternatives.  
6. Task 6 develops and presents the details of a seven-step framework for a DSS 
process.   
7. Task 7 develops a research theory and six hypotheses.  Note that the theory and 
hypotheses created were designed to provide structure and guidance to the 
development of analytical methods and the demonstration of the conceptual DSS 
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process and were not meant, in a more traditional sense, to be tested using 
standard statistical techniques.  
8. Task 8 develops two analytical methods for use in the DSS process (Chapter 4). 
9. Task 9 demonstrates the conceptual DSS process using a fictional toll road in an 
illustrative example (Chapter 5). 
10. Task 10 discusses the research finding, draws conclusions and offers ideas for 
future research. 
 
3.2 Task 1-Potential DSS Inputs and Outputs 
 
3.2.1  Potential DSS Inputs   
• Monetary Data:  
o Toll revenue 
o Revenue from service plazas 
o Other revenue 
o Operating costs 
o Capital costs 
o Existing debt service 
o Other costs 
o Lump sum payment 
o Total existing toll road debt 
 
• Quantitative Data: 
o Traffic demand 
o Travel delay 
o Service plaza Characteristics 
o Toll collection methods 
o Income levels of users 
o Average daily traffic (ADT) volumes 
o Level of service 
o Other 
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• Qualitative Data: 
o Perception of a need to defer tax increases 
o Perception of the importance of private sector responsibility 
o Perception of the importance of toll increases 
o Other 
 
3.2.2  Potential DSS Outputs  
• Cash flow  
• Monetary and monetizable costs and benefits expressed as Net Present Value 
• Non-monetizable costs and benefits   
 
3.3  Task 2 - A Conceptual DSS Model Base  
• Monetary and monetizable cost and benefit templates 
• Non-monetizable cost and benefit templates 
• Conceptual framework of DSS process 
 
3.4  Task 3 - A Conceptual DSS Knowledge Base  
• Organizational alternatives 
• Categories of variables 
• Monetary and monetizable Costs and Benefits 
• Non-monetizable costs and benefits 
• Information on existing agreements 
o Pennsylvania concession  
o Pennsylvania Act 44 
o Indiana Toll Road concession 
o Chicago Skyway concession 
o Other 
  
   45 
3.5 Task 4 – Two Categories of P3 Variables 
 
Four pairs of benefit/cost variables were initially identified.  The first pair consists 
of monetary benefits and monetary costs.  The second pair consists of non-monetary, but 
monetizable benefits and non-monetary, but monetizable costs.  The third pair consists of 
measurable, but non-monetizable benefits and measurable, but non-monetizable costs.  
The final pair consists of non-measurable and non-monetizable costs and non-measurable 
and non-monetizable benefits.   
These pairs of variables form four relatively distinct groups of variables: 
 
• Monetary Variables (which are expressed in dollars) 
• Monetizable Variables (which are measurable and monetizable) 
• Quantitative Variables (which are measurable, but not monetizable)   
• Qualitative Variables (which are not measurable and not monetizable) 
 
The groups can be further consolidated into two distinct categories of variables: 
• Monetary and Monetizable Variables   
o Represented in dollars 
• Non-Monetizable Variables   
o Represented in non-monetary terms 
 
Each of the categories and groups is defined and discussed below.  
 
3.5.1 Monetizable Variables 
 
3.5.1.1  Monetary Variables 
 
Monetary variables are those that are directly measured in dollars.  Examples of 
monetary variables include toll and non-toll revenue, operating costs, capital costs, debt 
service, and lump sum payment.  
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If one assumes that all assumptions made are accurate, analysis using monetary 
values is fairly straightforward.  However, as was seen in the analysis done for the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike agreement (Gray, Cusatis and Foote), the sensitivity with regard 
to assumptions made can be striking.  For the Pennsylvania agreement, a 1% change in 
the assumed yearly increase in traffic demand resulted in a $7.1 billion increase over the 
base case net present value of $15.4 billion. 
In future decision processes, monetary variables will likely continue to be a strong 
component.  First, because a lack of cash flow will continue to force public sector 
stakeholders to consider P3 toll road strategies and second, because these variables are 
often the most understood and easiest for which to gather data. 
 
3.5.1.2  Monetizable Variables 
 
These are variables that are measured using something other than dollars, but 
which can be converted into dollars using some per-unit dollar conversion factor. 
Monetizable variables are further defined as those variables for which the 
assumptions required to assign a per-unit dollar conversion factor to an individual 
variable meets or exceeds a user assigned level of confidence.  That level of confidence 
can be considered as a threshold of relevance, below which, monetary conversion cannot 
be considered accurate enough for inclusion in comparative analyses. 
Monetizable variables could include travel time or delay reductions due to the 
implementation of cashless payment systems, the cost of traffic diversion to other 
roadways as a result of toll increases, increased pavement life that results from life cycle 
costing methods or reductions in roadside damage as a result of safety improvements.  
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Ultimately, the public sector decision maker will determine the level of 
confidence used.  If confidence in the assumptions meets or exceeds the assigned 
threshold, then the variable is considered monetizable and given a dollar value.  If the 
assumptions do not meet the threshold, the variable is excluded from this sub-category.  
Excluded variables will be considered again as quantitative variables for inclusion in the 
non-monetizable analytical method.  
 
3.5.2 Non-Monetizable Variables 
 
These are the variables that cannot be converted into dollars.  They are typically 
not included in the calculation of net present value and would therefore not be 
represented in a cash flow diagram.  To assign relative importance or value to these 
variables and include them in the P3 existing toll road decision process a second 
analytical method is needed.  
 
3.5.2.1  Quantitative Variables 
 
These are the variables that did not meet the threshold required for inclusion as a 
monetizable variable.  Here, these excluded variables are considered a second time, 
without the need for assignment of a dollar value.  Examples of quantitative variables 
include customer service, traffic diversion, and travel time reliability. 
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3.5.2.2  Qualitative Variables 
 
These are variables that cannot be measured.  They are considered by many 
stakeholders and analysts to be truly qualitative variables.  Two examples of qualitative 
variables are the importance of providing toll road access to low income users and the 
level of importance associated with the government running toll road operations. 
 
3.6 Task 5 – Three Core Organizational Alternatives  
Toll road organizations can be aggregated into three core alternatives. There can be any number of variations in toll road organization; however, at the core of each variation appears to be one of these three alternatives.    
3.6.1 Alternative A: The Public Organization 
 In the public alternative, nothing changes from today’s organizational structure, operational policies and political relationships.  This alternative is the do‐nothing case, in which, toll road management and operations remain unchanged.  Toll increases are approved by the state legislature and subject to public opinion. 
 
3.6.2 Alternative B: The Public–Public Partnership Organization 
 
In the Public–Public Partnership alternative, toll road operations remain with the 
public sector entity, but the organizational structure, operational policies and political 
relationships are much changed.  This alternative assumes that the new public sector 
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entity will be given the same freedoms to raise revenue and control costs as would be 
given to a private sector concessionaire. 
 The alternative also assumes that the toll road entity will move quickly to create 
an organization that embraces change.  The organization will abandon many past 
practices in an effort to create a more productive and efficient organization.  The new 
public sector entity will contain many of the same structural and operational components 
as those of the private sector entity created for the Public–Private Partnership alternative.  
Toll increases will be scheduled and will not require approval of the legislature for each 
increase.   
 
3.6.3 Alternative C: The Public–Private Partnership Organization 
 
In the Public–Private Partnership alternative, operation of the toll road is leased 
(note that some definitions allow the use of the term sale) to a private sector 
concessionaire.  The existing public sector organization is abandoned in favor of a new 
private sector entity.  Existing workers may move to jobs with the private sector entity, 
but they will now be private sector employees under private sector management and 
decision-making.  Tolls increase yearly according to the schedule given in the concession 
agreement.  Toll increases do not require legislative are likely to be yearly and pace 
inflation. 
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3.7 Task 6 - A (conceptual) DSS Process Framework 
 
The following 7-steps form the conceptual DSS process framework:  
1. Determine objectives 
2. Populate cash flow diagrams for each core organizational alternative 
3. Analyze the monetizable results 
4. Complete the non-monetizable method 
5. Analyze the non-monetizable results 
6. Create additional organizational alternatives (if needed) 
7. Summarize, present and discuss results An overarching aim of the conceptual DSS process is to help improve the public sector decision‐maker’s understanding of the potential short‐ and long‐term implications of P3 toll road alternatives and to encourage the consideration and discussion of such implications in the planning and agreement negotiating process.  A well‐balanced decision process considers and weighs the influences of all objectives.  
 
3.7.1  Step 1: Determine Objectives 
 
The objectives stated as important by the decision maker need to be both short- and 
long-term in nature.  In addition, they need to be more than simply tasks to be 
accomplished.  For instance, maximizing lump sum price is a valid short-term objective.  
Providing and maintaining access to all user groups is a valid long-term objective.  
Paving the entire roadway surface and implementing “at speed” tolling are tasks to be 
accomplished.  These tasks do not provide the type of organizational or management 
vision required to be considered an objective in the decision process (Keeney, Value-
Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decisionmaking). 
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3.7.2  Step 2: Populate Cash Flow Diagrams for Each Core Alternative 
 
The next step in the process is to use assumptions, estimates of future conditions, and 
financial data to populate the cash flow diagrams for each of the three core organizational 
alternatives.  The cash flow calculation sheets calculate the net present value for each 
alternative, and that dollar value is shown on each of the cash flow diagrams.  The 
assumptions and estimates used in the calculations must be clearly stated and reasonable.  
For instance, to assume a yearly increase in traffic demand of 10% is not reasonable, 
however a rate of 0 to 2% increase per year might have merit as a reasonable range.  The 
discount rate used for the calculation of NPV is also an area for discussion.  For the 
private sector, a 12% discount rate might be considered high for present day conditions; 
however, might be a reasonable value when considered over the 50-plus-year term of the 
potential concession agreement.  When calculating NPV for the public sector 
organization, a 5% discount rate might be a more reasonable value.  
Non-monetary variables are then reviewed to determine which variables can be 
assigned a per-unit monetary value and monetized.  The decision maker must decide to 
what degree variables of a non-monetary nature should be monetized or converted into 
dollars?  Some will argue that all variables can, in some way, be converted into monetary 
terms and, for them, analysis becomes straightforward calculation once all variables are 
monetized.  However, for other decision maker’s questions arise with regard to the 
validity or relevance of some of the assumptions needed to assign monetary values to less 
measurable or tangible variables.  For example, how does one assign monetary value to 
the inherent perception that the government should be responsible for toll road operation? 
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Once a decision is made with regard to which variables can be assigned monetary 
value within an acceptable level of confidence, those that can be monetized are added to 
the cash flow diagram.  Those that cannot be assigned a dollar value are set aside for 
consideration in the non-monetizable factor method. 
 
3.7.3  Step 3: Analyze the Monetizable (Cash Flow Diagram) Results 
 
In step 3, the decision maker uses the net present value calculated for each core 
alternative, along with the visual nature of the cash flow diagrams, to analyze each of the 
possible choices.  The best alternative, from a monetizable perspective, is the one that 
best meets the monetary component of the stated objectives.   
For example, although the public-private partnership agreement might result in 
the highest net present value, a closer visual review of the cash flow diagram might 
disclose that the required yearly toll increases are too high.  The next highest net present 
value might be that of the public-public partnership alternative, which has somewhat 
higher increases in operating costs, but yearly toll increases that are lower.  Net present 
value forms the basis for the initial analysis, but the visual nature of the cash flow 
diagram allows for a more thorough review of the relative importance of individual 
monetizable variables.  
 
3.7.4  Step 4: Complete a Non-Monetizable Factor Method  
Once the monetary and monetizable analysis is complete, the next step is to 
consider non-monetizable (quantitative and qualitative) variables.  A Non-Monetizable 
Factor Method asks the decision maker to consider and respond to three statements.  
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There are three possible responses: do not agree, no opinion, or agree.  The three 
statements are: 
1. A major tax increase for transportation, such as a gas tax, sales tax, or income 
tax should be deferred. 
 
2. A private, for-profit company should operate the toll road, rather than a public 
agency. 
 
3. Tolls should continue to be charged at some nominal rate (1/2% annually) 
rather than increasing annually, typically at a rate of 2% to 5% depending on 
inflation.  
4.  
The decision maker is also asked to consider the statements relative to each other 
and to then assign 100 points amongst the three.  Both sets of responses are then 
weighted to establish the decision maker’s individual perspective with regard to non-
monetizable variables.  
 
3.7.5  Step 5: Analyze the Non-Monetizable Factor Method Results  
 
The non-monetizable (qualitative and quantitative) result is now compared to the 
alternative chosen based on the monetary and monetizable cash flow diagrams and net 
present values.  For instance, when the net present values and cash flow diagrams lead to 
a conclusion that the best P3 alternative is a public-private partnership agreement.  
However, the non-monetizable result indicates that the public alternative is the only one 
that best meets the non-monetizable perspectives of the decision maker.  In this instance, 
there is a potential disconnect, which is considered in step 6.  
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3.7.6  Step 6: Create Additional Organizational Alternatives (if needed) 
 
If the results of the non-monetizable result show a potential disconnect between 
the monetary and monetizable result and the non-monetizable result then a “hybrid” 
organizational alternative can be created.  This hybrid alternative is not a new core 
organizational alternative, but lies between two of the core alternatives and is intended to 
blend two core alternatives to better meet the needs of a specific decision maker.   
 
3.7.7  Step 7: Summarize, Present and Discuss Results 
 
Step 7 asks simply that the user consider which organizational alternative best 
meets the stated objectives, the monetary and monetizable result, and the non-monetary 
result.  That consideration, along with the state objectives, the assumptions made, and the 
results of both analytical methods can then be presented to superiors and/or the general 
public for further consideration and discussion.  
 
3.8 Task 7- Research Theory and Hypotheses  
3.8.1 Research Theory 
 
Transportation infrastructure assets are some of the most important held by 
government.  Their contributions to mobility, defense, and economic sustainability are 
widely known.  The introduction of P3 concession agreements in the United States has 
raised concerns that the conditions of these new lease agreements may lessen those 
valuable contributions.  In addition, the lack of transparency seen with existing 
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agreements has raised concerns that the general public may not have been provided with 
enough information on which to base opinions.      
The lack of a public sector decision support system (DSS) to assist in the 
evaluation and selection of P3 alternatives has contributed to these concerns, in that there 
are no analytical methods to aid in the determination of whether or not such public sector 
decisions are cost effective and in the best interests of the general public.  The theory 
examined in this research is that P3 alternatives for existing toll roads can be objectively 
evaluated when the key variables (monetary; non-monetary, but monetizable; and non-
monetary, not-monetizable) associated with each P3 alternative are identified, 
understood, and systematically analyzed in terms of their costs and benefits using a 
decision support process.  Such a process would tend to improve transparency and more 
likely lead to opportunities for the general public to form opinions and offer input.   
 
3.8.2 Research Hypotheses  
Six hypotheses are presented.  These hypotheses are closely tied to the four pairs 
of variables identified above.  The hypotheses are not meant, as such, in the traditional 
sense in that they will be tested using standard statistical techniques.  Instead, they are 
intended to bring organization and structure to the research process.  They are tested in 
Chapter 5, using an illustrative example.  
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3.8.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
 Some of the benefits of each alternative can be assessed in monetary terms. 
Let these terms be denoted as Mb,j,n. 
Where: 
M - denotes a monetary term,  
b - denotes benefit,  
j - denotes the number assigned to that specific variable and  
n - denotes the year under consideration. 
  
3.8.2.2 Hypothesis 2  
 Some of the costs of each alternative can be assessed in monetary terms. 
Let these terms be denoted as Mc,j,n. 
Where: 
M - denotes a monetary term,  
c - denotes cost,  
j - denotes the number assigned to that specific variable and  
n - denotes the year under consideration. 
 
3.8.2.3 Hypothesis 3  
 Some of the benefits of each alternative can be assessed in non-monetary, but 
monetizable terms.   
Let these terms be denoted as Nb,j,n. 
Where: 
N - denotes a non-monetary, but monetizable term,  
b - denotes benefit,  
j - denotes the number assigned to that specific variable and  
n - denotes the year under consideration. 
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3.8.2.4 Hypothesis 4  
Some of the costs of each alternative can be assessed in non-monetary, but 
monetizable terms. 
Let these terms be denoted as Nc,j,n. 
Where: 
N - denotes a non-monetary, but monetizable term,  
c - denotes cost,  
j - denotes the number assigned to that specific variable and  
n - denotes the year under consideration. 
 
3.8.2.5 Hypothesis 5  
 Some of the benefits and costs of each alternative can be assessed in non-
monetary, non-monetizable, but measurable terms.  These variables will be referred to as 
quantitative. 
Let these terms be denoted as Lj,n. 
Where: 
L - denotes a non-monetary, non- monetizable variable,  
j - denotes the number assigned to that specific variable and  
n - denotes the year under consideration.  
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3.8.2.6 Hypothesis 6  
Some of the costs and benefits of each alternative can be assessed in non-
monetary, non-monetizable and non-measurable terms.  These are the qualitative 
variables. 
Let these terms be denoted as Kj,n. 
Where: 
K - denotes a non-monetary, non-monetizable (or qualitative) variable,  
j - denotes the number assigned to that specific variable and  
n - denotes the year under consideration. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYTICAL METHODS  
(RESEARCH APPROACH – TASK 8)  
4.1 Monetizable and Non-Monetizable Analytical Methods   
 The second research objective is “to propose an approach, including a set of 
analytical methods required in such a DSS, to assess the benefits and costs associated 
with the alternative P3 strategies.  Central to the achievement of this objective will be the 
identification and estimation of the benefits and costs associated with each of the P3 
strategies so that the net benefit of each P3 alternative can be evaluated.” 
Task 8 in the research process required the development of two analytical 
methods to support the seven-step DSS process framework.  The first method needed to 
consider and allow for the evaluation of monetary and monetizable variables.  The second 
needed to consider and allow for the evaluation of non-monetizable variables.  
This chapter introduces two analytical methods designed to accomplish that 
requirement.  The first is a monetary and monetizable factor method, which incorporates 
all variables, which are monetary or can be monetized.  The method uses cash flow 
diagrams to combine cost/benefit analysis with net present value analysis.  The second is 
a non-monetizable factor method that incorporates variables that are quantitative, but not 
monetizable, as well as those, which are truly qualitative.  The method asks the decision 
maker to respond to key qualitative statements and then uses those responses to gauge 
perceptions with regard to organizational alternatives. 
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4.2 Method 1: A Method of Analysis for Monetary and Monetizable Factors  
4.2.1 The Cash Flow Diagram 
 
The cash flow diagram (Bruun) uses a visual method to combine both benefit/cost 
analysis and the calculation of net present value.  The visual nature of the cash flow 
diagram should increase understanding of the influence individual variables have on the 
calculation of net present value.  This visual nature is in contrast to standard calculations 
of net present value that result in a single number for comparison.  Cash flow diagram 
templates for each of the 3 core organizational alternatives are presented below.  Net 
Present Value (NPV) is also discussed and the equation for net present value is presented.  
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FIGURE 4-1 Cash Flow Diagram Template for Alternative A:  
The Public Organization (Bruun). 
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FIGURE 4-2 Cash Flow Diagram Template for Alternative B:  
The Public–Public Partnership Organization (Bruun). 
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FIGURE 4-3 Cash Flow Diagram Template for Alternative C:  
The Public–Private Partnership Organization (Bruun). 
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4.2.2 Net Present Value 
 
The result of each cash flow diagram is the sum of the net present values for the 
first category of variables, which includes the following monetary and monetizable 
variables: 
• Monetary costs 
• Monetary benefits  
• Non-monetary, but monetizable costs  
• Non-monetary, but monetizable benefits.   
 
As part of the cash flow diagram, a net present value will be calculated for each of the 3 
core organizational alternatives using the equation: 
 
4.2.2.1 Net Present Value Equation  
 
 
Where: 
  Mb,j,n.- denotes a monetary benefit, for variable j, in year n. 
Mc,j,n.- denotes a monetary cost, for variable j, in year n. 
Nb,j,n.- denotes a non-monetary, but monetizable benefit, for variable j,  
in year n. 
 Nc,j,n.- denotes a non-monetary, but monetizable cost, for variable j,  
in year n. 
 
b - denotes a benefit,  
c – denotes a cost, 
j - denotes the specific variable of that type  
n - denotes the year under consideration 
i – denotes the discount rate chosen 
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The decision maker can then use both the cash flow diagrams and the net present 
value to determine which alternative offers the most value from a monetary and 
monetizable perspective. 
 
4.3 Method 2: A Method of Analysis for Non-Monetizable Factors 
 
This method of analysis is designed to capture the potential influence of 
quantitative and qualitative variables.  These are variables that cannot be expressed in 
monetary terms; because the assumptions required do not produce reliable or credible 
monetary results.  They are not represented in the cash flow diagram and their influence 
is not included in the calculation of net present value.  To assign relative importance or 
value to these variables and allow the decision maker to include them in their toll road 
decision process, a second analytical method was needed.   
 
4.3.1 Initial Attempts and Reconsidering Variables  
Initial attempts to create a non-monetizable method failed, but provided useful 
insight.  First attempts included a survey that asked a number of key questions and then 
assigned weights to reflect perspectives with respect to non-monetizable (quantitative and 
qualitative) variables.  Examples of the key questions considered include: 
 
1. Does the alternative improve organizational efficiency? 
 
2. Does the alternative allow for the rapid integration of technology?   
3. Does the alternative require legislative approval or changes in statute before 
implementation? 
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4. Is there significant potential for traffic diversion or changes in travel demand?  
5. Is the alternative likely to stimulate economic development?    
6. Does the alternative promote fairness/equity amongst segments of travelers?  
7. Does the alterative change the way in which tolls are set?  
8. Does the alternative lead to deferred tax increases?  
9. Does the alternative improve customer service? 
 
Weights assigned to answers were then multiplied by values assigned to reflect 
the likely influence each of the P3 organizational alternatives would have on the question 
asked.  In some of the models, the decision maker was asked not only to answer 
questions, but also to assign weights to values used to measure the influence of each 
alternative.  The result was a numerical score for each alternative.  That score could then 
be used in a relative manner to determine a preferred alternative.  The concept or hope 
was to create a method that could be explained in one equation and would be easy to use. 
Unfortunately, that hope proved unrealistic.  When various stakeholders were 
considered, value assumptions were found to change significantly as the wording of 
questions changed.  Those value assumptions differed from stakeholder to stakeholder 
and from variable to variable and, no matter how questions were worded, strong concerns 
were expressed that the assumptions being made to create the questions were adding 
significant bias to the decision process.  As the research progressed, there remained hope 
that wording or clarification could be found that would allow the methods being 
considered to fit the majority of stakeholders.  However, that goal was elusive and never 
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found.  True to their name, the quantitative and qualitative variables resisted value 
judgment in any but the simplest of terms.   
A new approach was required and the first step toward finding that new approach 
was to re-consider the questions being asked and the variables being considered.  The 
process showed that questions using words and terms, such as: customer service, 
organizational efficiency, fairness, equity, technology, economic development, and travel 
demand were impossible to define with consistency across the various stakeholders.   For 
example, to some, the term customer service means delivering service at the lowest 
possible cost.  To others, the term means delivering the fastest service even if that means 
higher cost.  To still others, the term means providing the highest possible number of 
amenities to enjoy during the trip even if that slows the trip and increases its price.  The 
question of which organizational alternative delivered the best customer service was 
found impossible to define and eliminated, as were other questions where similar 
conflicting arguments over definition could not be resolved.   
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4.3.2 The Non-Monetizable Factor Method Survey  
The results of the reconsideration process were three statements that seemed to 
provide clear definitions even when applied across stakeholders and which captured the 
essence of the set of potential perceptions being investigated.  These statements are: 
  
4.3.2.1  Statement 1 – Deferring a major tax increase 
 
 A major tax increase for transportation, such as a gas tax, sales tax, or 
income tax should be deferred. 
This statement captures the perceived level of importance that funds needed to 
finance transportation infrastructure should be raised and spent by the government.  If the 
statement is not agreed with, then the inferred perception is that needed funds may come 
from increased taxes.  If the statement is agreed with, then the inferred perception is that 
needed funds must come from sources other than tax increases.   
 
4.3.2.2  Statement 2 – Toll Road Operation 
 
A public agency should operate the toll road, rather than a private, for-profit 
company. 
There exists a wide range of perceptions over how large the role of the 
government should be in the operation of public sector assets.  This set of perceptions 
typically has three components.  The first involves the level to which government acts in 
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the best interests of society.  The second involves the level to which the “profit motive” 
as a tool that can maximize organizational efficiency.  The third involves the level to 
which private sector competition exists and keeps prices low and quality high; however, 
private sector competition might not be a significant issue in this type of P3 decision 
process because very few private sector organizations have the ability to operate such 
large assets.  
For individuals at the extreme ends of the spectrum, this statement is 
straightforward.  At one end of the spectrum are individuals who believe strongly in the 
government’s ability to act on behalf of society.  Removing the toll road from 
government operation will weaken the government’s ability to create or influence polices 
that are in the best interests of society.  At the other end of the spectrum are individuals 
who believe public sector agencies are inherently wasteful and inefficient.  Replacing 
these public operations with private sector operations is the only way to increase 
efficiency, reduce costs, and maximize organizational efficiency. 
For individuals anywhere other than at the extremes, this statement can be 
difficult.  These people will need to closely examine their core perceptions and then 
weigh all of the potential impacts associated with each of the available organizational 
alternatives.    For example, what will be the impact if the needs of society erode under a 
private sector operator?  Will the private operator demands increased efficiency and 
profit maximization at the expense of customer service and user needs?  What will be the 
impact of eliminating toll road debt?  Will that increase funding of other transportation 
projects supporting the needs of society?  
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4.3.2.3  Statement 3 – Rate of Yearly Toll Increase 
 
Tolls should continue to be charged at some nominal rate (1/2% annually) 
rather than increasing annually, typically at a rate of 2% to 5% depending on 
inflation. 
 
Some people believe that users of a toll road should pay the highest toll rate 
possible.  Only by charging closer to the highest rate users are willing to pay will the 
value of the asset be maximized.  Other people believe that increasing tolls has the 
potential to restrict access for lower income user groups and small businesses.  They 
further believe increases have the potential to increase traffic diversion to other routes not 
designed to handle the diverted traffic.  Still others have difficulty balancing the two 
issues and will need to closely examine their core perceptions and then weigh all of the 
potential impacts associated with each position.  
 
Decision makers are asked to respond to each statement in one of three ways: 
1. Do Not Agree 
2. No Opinion 
3. Agree 
 
Decision makers are further asked to distribute 100 points amongst the three 
statements to rate the importance of each statement in relation to the other two.  
Therefore, decision makers are asked to respond in two ways.  The first asks them to 
respond to the individual statement.  The second asks them to respond to the relative 
importance of each statement to the others. 
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FIGURE 4-4 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Survey 
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4.3.3 The Non-Monetizable Factor Method – Analysis  
 
There are 27 possible sets of responses to the above survey.  All possible response 
sets are listed in Table 4-1, Non-Monetizable Factor Method Analysis.  Analysis of the 
possible response sets resulted in the conclusion that three of the response sets could, 
with considerable certainty, be associated with the three core P3 organizational 
alternatives introduced in Section 3.6.  Table 4-2, summarizes the correlations found. 
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TABLE 4-1 Non-Monetizable Factor Method - Analysis 
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TABLE 4-2 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Knowledge Base 
 
 
Alternative A: Public Organization was found to be strongly associated with a 
response of “Do not Agree” for all three statements in the Non-Monetizable Factor 
Method Survey.  That response set is recorded as “1-1-1.”  This decision maker does not 
agree that a major tax increase should be deferred.  The decision maker does not agree 
that a private, for-profit company should operate the toll road and does not agree that tolls 
should increase annually, typically at 2% to 5% depending on inflation.  These are the 
three responses that most strongly favor the public organization. 
Alternative B: The Public-Public Partnership Organization lies between the two 
extremes.  This  alternative has been most strongly associated with a response set of  
“2-2-2.”  To understand that reasoning, one must first assume that a response of “No 
Opinion” to each of the statements does not imply that the decision maker is not 
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interested in the decision process.  The response instead assumes that this decision maker 
has no strong opinion toward alternatives A or C.  Given that assumption, a further 
assumption is made that this decision maker will seek an organization that lies 
somewhere between the two extremes.  By definition, that alternative has been defined as 
Alternative B: The Public-Public Partnership Organization. 
Alternative C: The Public-Private Partnership Organization is at the other end of 
the range of possible response sets.  This decision maker agrees with all three of the 
survey statements.  He or she agrees that a major tax increase should be deferred, agrees 
that a private, for-profit company should operate the toll road, and agrees that tolls should 
increase annually, typically at 2% to 5% depending on inflation.  The response set is 
recorded as “3-3-3” and is strongly correlated with Alternative C: The Public-Private 
Partnership Organization.  
Once the three response sets associated with the core organizational alternatives 
were determined, attention turned to the response sets that lie between each of the three 
known points.  A second method was needed that added a finer level of measurement to 
gauge the decision maker’s perspectives with regard to the relative importance of each 
statement presented in relation to the others.  
The solution was a weighting method that distributes 100 points among the three 
statements.  The decision maker is asked to determine the relative importance of each 
statement in relation to the other and then to divide 100 points among the three 
statements.  The points assigned to each statement are then multiplied by the difference 
between the actual response given for that statement and the expected response associated 
with core Alternative A.  The results for each statement are summed, divided by 2 and 
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assigned the absolute value.  The resulting weight represents the distance from the 
expected response for Alternative A to the actual response given and is used to identify 
potential disconnects between the response set and the assignment of points for the 
weighting process.  Such disconnects can help identify conflicts between monetary and 
monetizable results and the non-monetary perspectives of the decision maker. 
 
This weighting method is governed by the equation: 
 
 
Given that: 
W(E(A)­R) = the weight (W) representing the distance from the expected      
response set for Alternative A, to the measured response set (R). 
x      = the statement number  
Rx   = the response measured for statement x 
E(Ax)    = the expected answer to statement x for Alternative A 
Px   = the number of points (P) assigned to question x  
 
For example, suppose the decision maker response set was “1-2-1” and the points 
assignment was such that, 60 are assigned to statement 1, 10 are assigned to statement 2, 
and 30 are assigned to statement 3, for a point assignment of “60-10-30.”  The weight 
associated with this response combination is calculated as follows:   
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W(E(A)-R) = |[(1-1) x 60] + [(1-2) x 10] + [(1-1) x 30] | / 2 = 5 
W(E(A)-R) = 5 
 
100 points represent the total distance from Alternative A to Alternative C.  The 
calculated weight of 5 places the result close to Alternative A.  This result is in agreement 
with the response set result, which is also close to the known response set associated with 
Alternative A.  Therefore, no potential disconnect between the response set and the 
calculated weight is found. 
The result provides the decision maker with a basis for discussion with regard to 
the non-monetary perspectives of the decision maker in relation to the organizational 
alternatives.  The result can be used in conjunction with the analysis of the monetary and 
monetizable factor method to increase information and create discussion about the 
decision process. 
 
4.3.4  Summarizing Results 
 
Table 4-3 is a summary sheet that on one-page, records the results of both the 
Monetary and Monetizable Factor Method and the Non-Monetizable Factor Method.  
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TABLE 4-3 Summary of Methods 1 and 2 – Monetary and Monetizable Factor 
Method and Non-Monetizable Factor Method 
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4.3.5 Create Hybrid Organizational Alternatives 
 
Step 6 of the conceptual DSS process states that if the results of the Non-
Monetizable Factor Method show a potential disconnect with the Monetary and 
Monetizable Factor Method result, then a hybrid organizational alternative can be 
created.   The hybrid alternative is intended to blend two core alternatives to better meet 
the needs of a specific decision maker.  By identifying potential disconnects in non-
monetizable factor method response sets and calculated weights and also by assigning a 
relative distance from Alternative A to that disconnect, the Non-Monetizable Factor 
Method can help determine the type of hybrid alternative that is needed.  Table 4-4 shows 
the Non-Monetizable Factor Method Analysis with the two hybrid alternatives included.  
Figures 4-5 and 4-6 show cash flow diagram templates created for each of the potential 
hybrid alternatives. 
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TABLE 4-4 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Analysis with  
Hybrid Alternatives D and E 
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FIGURE 4-5 Cash Flow Diagram Template for Alternative D: Hybrid Public–
Private Partnership Organization (Hybrid) (Bruun). 
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FIGURE 4-6 Cash Flow Diagram Template for Alternative E: Hybrid Public 
Organization (Hybrid) (Bruun). 
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CHAPTER 5 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
(RESEARCH APPROACH – TASK 9) 
 
5.1 Fictional Toll Road -  “USA” 
 
Toll Road – “USA” is a fictional existing toll road somewhere in the United 
States.  A fictional toll road was chosen for use in the illustrative example for several 
reasons.   
First, using an actual toll road had the potential to shift the focus of discussion 
from the conceptual framework being proposed to one of a policy or political nature.  The 
conclusions drawn might have become more important than the intended demonstration 
of the conceptual framework.  The intent of the research is not to make recommendations 
for any one existing toll road.   
Second, much of the detailed data for existing toll roads being considered for P3 
is held by consultants outside of the public realm and not subject to public sector rules 
regarding freedom of information.  Once a toll road is under P3 agreement the situation 
becomes even more difficult, as the entire organization is then outside of the public sector 
realm.   
Third, using data from the Pennsylvania turnpike, Chicago Skyway and Indiana 
Toll Road, as well as, information from New Jersey, Texas, California and 
Massachusetts, a set of reasonable assumptions was developed for the fictional toll road.  
For example, initial assumptions included that the toll authority has $2.3 billion of 
existing long-term toll road debt.  Tolls have been held at a “nominal” rate by the state 
legislature.  Efforts by the toll road authority to increase tolls, as well as, efforts by the 
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governor’s office to increase the gas tax have failed repeatedly.  Other alternatives are 
needed and questions concerning the possibility of creating a concession level public-
private partnership have been raised.   
All other assumptions required during calculation of the illustrative examples for 
each of the 3 core organizational alternatives, as well as the 2 hybrid alternatives, are 
given during the discussion of those alternatives.  
 
5.2 Five Fictional Decision Makers and Their Decision Objectives  
Five fictional public sector decision makers have agreed to investigate P3 
alternatives for the existing toll road USA.  These stakeholders will use the conceptual 
framework and process developed in this dissertation.  Five decision makers were 
created, rather than just one, in an effort to demonstrate the influence and importance of 
non-monetizable factors in the decision process.  Details for each of the decision makers 
as well as their potential objectives are as follows: 
 
5.2.1 The Secretary of Transportation 
 
5.2.1.1 A Brief Biography  
• He is 49 years old 
• He is a lawyer by profession and, before becoming Secretary, drafted legislation for 
clients and the legislatures. 
• He was appointed by the current governor and given the mandate to find a solution to 
current dire cash flow problems associated with existing debt service. 
• He expects to be in office for a maximum of 2 years.  That is a typical length of 
tenure for a Secretary of Transportation. 
• He wants very much to leave a legacy. 
• He is a Democrat and considered a fiscal conservative, but is a social liberal. 
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5.2.1.2 Decision Objectives 
 
• To leave a legacy. 
• To create revenue quickly that can be used to pay off existing toll road debt and if 
possible to generate funds for new transportation projects outside of the turnpike 
authority. 
• To initiate needed legislation that will provide for adequate statewide transportation 
funding in the future. 
 
5.2.2 The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the Turnpike Authority  
5.2.2.1 A Brief Biography  
• The CFO is not interested in leaving a legacy.   
• The CFO is interested in finding a solution to the current cash flow crisis.   
• The CFO’s objectives are short-term in that she is interested only in the problems 
that exist today and her focus is financial. 
• She is 55 years old. 
• She is an accountant by trade and worked as an auditor in private industry. 
• She was hired by the current Secretary of Transportation to study the current fiscal 
crisis and to then offer solutions. 
• She is a Democrat and considered a fiscal conservative. 
 
5.2.2.2 Decision Objectives 
 
• To discover and investigate all possible solutions to the current cash flow crisis. 
• To present those solutions to the Governor and then to implement the solution chosen 
by the Governor.  
 
5.2.3 The Chief Engineer of the Turnpike Authority 
 
5.2.3.1 A Brief Biography 
 
• The Chief is interested in increasing productivity within the agency and lowering the 
cost of design and construction, while increasing the quality of completed projects.   
• He is interested in engineering and process and not in creating a legacy.   
• He is 63 years old. 
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• He was appointed by the current Secretary of Transportation. 
• He is a Civil Engineer by trade and worked as an engineering consultant for most of 
his career. 
• He sees great potential for the agency. 
 
5.2.3.2 Decision Objectives  
• To determine what value the P3 alternatives have to offer. 
• To determine how the existing agency can resist P3 alternatives. 
 
5.2.4 The Chair of State Senate Transportation Committee 
 
5.2.4.1 A Brief Biography 
 
• The Senator has been in office for over 30 years.   
• He prides himself in the fact that he delivers for those in his district.   
• He has taken a no new taxes pledge. 
• He is 72 years old. 
• He is most interested in maintaining his voter base. 
• He has voted against increases in the gas tax. 
• He was a successful business owner before entering politics. 
• He is a Republican. 
 
5.2.4.2 Decision Objectives 
 
• To avoid unpopular stances or votes. 
• To generate funds in the short-term that will help avoid the need for a tax increase.  
5.2.5 The Chair of State House of Representatives Transportation Committee 
 
5.2.5.1 A Brief Biography  
• She is 42 years old. 
• She has been in office for 6 years.  She rose to the top of the House Transportation 
Committee quickly after identifying and exposing the current cash flow crisis.  She 
wants a long-term solution to transportation funding needs. 
• She is a lawyer by trade and practiced criminal law before she entered politics. 
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• She is most proud of the pro-bono work she did for the poor and under privileged. 
• She voted for the proposed increase in the gas tax. 
• She is politically astute and wants to make a mark quickly. 
• She is a Republican, but willing to work with the other party. 
 
5.2.5.2 Decision Objectives: 
 
• To change the status quo. 
• To find a long-term solution to transportation financing. 
• To maintain access for all users of the toll road at an affordable price. 
 
5.3 Method 1: The Monetary and Monetizable Factor Method   
5.3.1 Cash Flow Diagrams for Core Organizational Alternatives  
The second step in the process is to populate cash flow diagrams for each of the 
core alternatives.  Each cash flow diagram is calculated for a 50-year time period and 
includes a discussion of the assumptions and calculations made for that cash flow 
diagram.  The monetary and monetizable values used are meant to demonstrate the 
concepts and methodologies involved in creating cash flow diagrams. They are based on 
the financial statements for an existing toll road, but are not meant to represent a true 
condition.    
 
5.3.1.1 Alternative A: The Public Organization 
  
In this alternative, toll increases remain highly politicized and are granted 
primarily based on the public and political will for such increases.  As shown in  
Figure 5-1, revenue generated from tolls is assumed to increase by an average value of 
0.5% per year to reflect that assumption.  The underlying assumption is that a toll 
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increase of approximately 2.5% will be approved only once every 5 years.  Smoothing 
that value into an annual increase results in a rise of 0.5% per year.    
Increases in other sources of revenue are also assumed to increase at 0.5% per 
year.  The assumption here is that new revenue sources will not be aggressively pursued 
by the existing public sector organization and, therefore, this revenue stream will increase 
only slowly.  
The existing organizational structure is expected to remain.  Union, pension, 
management, procedural, technological and other issues affecting productivity, 
purchasing and revenue collection are expected to change only slowly.   To reflect that 
assumption, operating costs are increased at the assumed inflation rate of 2% per year.    
Capital investment will continue to be influenced by politics and the availability 
of new debt instruments.  Life cycle costing and true asset management will not be 
adopted.  Capital investment is assumed to only occur when debt instruments are 
available and political will allows for their use.  To reflect these assumptions, yearly 
expenditures of $1 million are assumed.  
Debt service is handled in three parts.  The first part is the $74 million per year of 
debt service associated with the $2.2 billion of existing toll road debt held at the start of 
the 50-year period of analysis.  That debt is “paid down” over a 30-year period, starting 
in year 0.  The second part of the debt service is associated with the yearly $1 million of 
capital expenditure.  This debt service is cumulative for 30 years and then remains at the 
same level each year for the remainder of the 50 years, because each additional increment 
of debt service is offset by an increment of 30-year debt service that ends.  The third part 
of the debt service results from operating cost shortfalls for each year.  The total cost of 
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interest over the 30-year period of the debt instruments used is shown in the year of 
operating shortfall occurrence.  The total amount is shown in the first year for two 
reasons.  First, ease of calculation, because the relative amounts are small and second, to 
create a more accurate representation of Net Present Value. 
Table A-1 and Table A-2 in Appendix A are Excel calculation sheets used to 
create inputs for the cash flow diagram for Alternative A (Figure 5-1).  In summary, the 
spreadsheet:   
 
• Increases toll revenue at 0.5% per year. 
• Increases other revenue at 0.5% per year. 
• Increases operating costs at 2.0% per year. 
• Incorporates capital expenditure at $1 million per year. 
• Uses a municipal bond rate of 5%. 
• Uses a discount rate of 5%. 
 
The spreadsheet calculates toll revenue, other revenue and operating costs in 
individual columns.  The three types of debt service are then calculated and all of the 
columns are added into the net revenue column.  This column is then used in the 
calculation of net present value (NPV), which for Alternative A is a (negative) 
$-0.6 billion for the 50-year period of analysis. 
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FIGURE 5-1 Cash Flow Diagram for Alternative A: Public Organization (Bruun). 
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5.3.1.2 Alternative B: Public–Public Partnership Organization 
 
In this alternative, public and political will are assumed to have little influence 
over toll road operations and policy.  Toll revenue is assumed to increase yearly, typically 
by a scheduled amount between 2% and 5%.  Toll schedules in existing concession 
agreements have been indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  For this example, yearly variation is smoothed and as shown in  
Figure 5-2, toll revenue is increased at a constant rate of 2% per year for the entire  
50-year period of analysis.  Other Revenue is also assumed to increase at 2% per year.  
The underlying assumption for this increase in Other Revenue is that the public-public 
partnership organization will actively seek new sources of revenue and will also work to 
increase the size of existing Other Revenue. 
Operating Costs are assumed to increase at 1% per year.  This rate of increase 
reflects a 1% per year reduction in relation to the public organization; however, operating 
cost reductions are not assumed to be as large as those achieved in the public-private 
partnership alternative.  The larger stewardship role required of any public organization is 
assumed to require additional operations and costs, which would not be required of a 
private sector organization. 
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  Capital costs are assessed as two lump sums of $15 million in years 0 and 30. 
The amount and spacing of the payments was designed to support the assumption that life 
cycle costing and true asset management have been adopted.  The asset will be repaired 
or rebuilt on a need and timing basis that results in the lowest possible cost and longest 
possible asset life.   Politics and the availability of debt instruments are assumed to no 
longer determine when repairs are made to the toll road. 
Debt service is again handled in three parts. The first part is the $74 million per 
year of debt service associated with the $2.2 billion of existing toll road debt at the start 
of the 50-year period of analysis.  That debt is “paid down” over a 30-year period, 
starting in year 0.  The second part of the debt service is the $1.1 million per year 
associated with the two $15 million lump sum capital expenditures. Since these debt 
instruments are assumed to have a 30-year term, the debt service remains at the same 
level for each of the 50 years. .  The third part of the debt service results from operating 
cost shortfalls for each year.  The total cost of interest over the 30-year period of the debt 
instruments used is shown in the year of operating shortfall occurrence.  The total amount 
is shown in the first year for two reasons.  First, ease of calculation, because the relative 
amounts are small and second, to create a more accurate representation of Net Present 
Value. 
An annual payment toward assuring access to the toll road for all users has been 
added to the cash flow diagram.  This payment is designed to help alleviate the impact of 
yearly toll increases on low-income and small business users.  Ten percent of annual 
revenue has been allocated to this assumed cost. 
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Table A-3 and Table A-4 of Appendix A are the Excel calculation sheets used to 
create inputs for the cash flow diagram shown in Figure 5-2.  In summary, the 
spreadsheet:  
 
• Increases toll revenue at 2.0% per year. 
• Increases other revenue at 2.0% per year. 
• Increases operating costs at 1.0% per year. 
• Incorporates capital expenditure lump sums of $15 million per year at 
years 0 and 30. 
• Incorporates an offset payment for low-income users of 10% of toll 
revenue. 
• Uses a municipal bond rate of 5%. 
• Uses a discount rate of 5%. 
 
The spreadsheet calculates toll revenue, other revenue, operating costs and the 
offset payment for low-income users in individual columns.  The three types of debt 
service are then calculated and all of the columns are added into the net revenue column.  
This column is then used in the calculation of net present value (NPV), which for 
Alternative B is a (positive) $1.9 billion for the 50-year period of analysis. 
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FIGURE 5-2 Cash Flow Diagram for Alternative B: Public–Public Partnership 
Organization (Bruun). 
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5.3.1.3  Alternative C: The Public–Private Partnership Organization 
 
The cash flow diagram for this alternative is shown in Figure 5-3.  This cash flow 
diagram looks significantly different than those for the other two alternatives, because the 
public sector decision maker is interested only in year 0.  Beyond that point in time, the 
private sector concessionaire will control toll road operations.  Once the public-private 
partnership agreement is implemented, the public sector will no longer collect toll road 
revenue or be responsible for yearly operating costs, capital costs, debt service, or other 
expenses.  All revenue from toll road operations will flow to the concessionaire.  In this 
alternative, the public sector is converting its yearly revenue stream and yearly costs into 
a single lump sum payment and is interested only in that single payment at year 0. 
 The lump sum payment offered in this alternative is then calculated as  
$1.4 billion.  Toll road debt at year 0 is assumed to be $2.2 billion.  The resulting Net 
Present Value for Alternative C is therefore $1.4 billion - $2.2 billion = $ -0.8 billion for 
the 50-year period of analysis.  The example assumes that the public sector will use all of 
the lump sum to pay off existing toll road debt in year 0.  Any remaining lump sum 
payment would then be available for public sector reinvestment.  In this case, the 
remaining toll road debt after application of the lump sum would need to be paid for 
using other funding sources.  
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To determine the lump sum value offered in this alternative, more was required 
than simply choosing a number.  First, considerable thought was put into the assumptions 
made.  The thought process was different than the process used for the other two 
alternatives, because different questions of uncertainty and discount rate were involved.  
Potential impacts of uncertainty include: annual debt service being higher than 
estimated, traffic demand being lower than estimated and resulting in lower than 
expected revenue, operating costs being higher than calculated, and public or political 
opinion leading to poor public relations and even contract revisions.  These four 
examples are just some of the potential impacts that must be factored into the choice of 
NPV discount rate used for the calculation of any lump sum payment offered.   
Tables A-5 and A-6, of Appendix A, are the excel calculation sheets used to 
create the lump sum payment offered.  The calculations included are not meant to include 
all of the possible calculations that could be made; however, they are meant to represent 
the significant variables or issues that are likely to be considered. In summary, the 
spreadsheet:  
 
• Increases toll revenue at 2.0% per year. 
• Increases other revenue at 2.0% per year. 
• Increases operating costs at 0.0% per year. 
• Incorporates capital expenditure lump sums of $15 million per year at 
years 0 and 30. 
• Uses a debt instrument rate of 10%. 
• Uses a discount rate of 12%. 
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The spreadsheet calculates toll revenue, other revenue, operating costs, and two 
types of debt service in individual columns.  There are only two types of debt service for 
this alternative, because the private sector concessionaire does not take over existing toll 
road debt service.  The first is the debt service associated with capital expenditures, 
which are the same as those calculated for Alternative B.  The second is the debt service 
associated with interest payments on operating cost shortfalls, which is again calculated 
as done in Alternatives A and B.  All of the columns are then added into the net revenue 
column.  This column is used in the calculation of net present value (NPV), which for 
Alternative C is a (negative) $-0.8 billion for the 50-year period of analysis.  
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FIGURE 5-3 Cash Flow Diagram for Alternative C: Public–Private Partnership 
Organization (Bruun). 
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5.3.2 Method 1 Results and Analysis 
 
5.3.2.1 Summary of Net Present Values  
Table 5-1 summarizes the net present values calculated for the three core 
alternatives.  Additional information will be added to this table after completion of 
Method 2: The Non-Monetizable Factor Method.   
TABLE 5-1 Summary of Method 1 - Results   
 
  
   100 
  
5.3.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Toll Revenue  
A sensitivity analysis comparing yearly increases in toll revenue and net present 
value is shown in Table 5-2.  Both tabular and graphical representations are provided.  
All other variables were held constant at their assumed levels during the analysis.  The 
yearly increase in toll revenue was then varied for each alternative and the resulting NPV 
recorded.  The results show that Alternatives A and B are quite sensitive to the rate of toll 
revenue increase per year.  Alternative C is much less sensitive to toll rate increases.  
This is primarily the result of its higher discount rate, which dampens sensitivity.  The 
positive NPV of Alternative C, even at low values for toll revenue increase, is the result 
of a number of variables including: no existing debt service, lower operating costs and no 
offset payment for low income users.  The analysis demonstrates the importance of toll 
revenue to toll road health.   
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TABLE 5-2 Sensitivity Analysis for Toll Revenue –  
Yearly Increase for Alternatives A, B, and C 
 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis
Variable
A B C
0.5% (0.6) 0.3 1.1
1.0% 0.2 0.8 1.2
2.0% 1.5 1.9 1.4
3.0% 3.1 3.3 1.7
4.0% 5.2 5.2 2.1
5.0% 8.1 7.8 2.6
6.0% 12.1 11.4 3.1
7.0% 17.5 16.3 3.8
Toll Revenue - Yearly Increase
Sensitivity Analysis
Change in Net Present Value (Billions)
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5.3.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Other Revenue 
 
A sensitivity analysis comparing yearly increases in other revenue and net present 
value is shown in Table 5-3.  Both tabular and graphical representations are provided.  
All other variables were held constant at their assumed levels during the analysis.  The 
yearly increase in other revenue was then varied for each alternative and the resulting 
NPV recorded.  The yearly rate of toll revenue increase is now fixed at 0.5% for 
Alternative A and at 2% for Alternatives B and C.   
Alternative A and B appear to be quite sensitive to the rate of other revenue 
increase per year.  However, the size of NPV increase is relatively small, because of the 
relatively smaller size of the other revenue in comparison to toll revenue.  For Alternative 
A, at a 3% yearly increase in other revenue, the NPV becomes a positive value. 
The sensitivity of Alternative C appears to be much less than that of Alternatives 
A and B.  The reason again lies in the difference in NPV discount rates.  The 12% rate 
used in Alternative C dampens sensitivity to other revenue increases. 
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TABLE 5-3 Sensitivity Analysis for Other Revenue –  
Yearly Increase for Alternatives A, B, and C 
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5.3.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Operating Costs 
 
A sensitivity analysis comparing yearly increases in operating costs and net 
present value is shown in Table 5-4.  Both tabular and graphical representations are 
provided.  All other variables were held constant at their assumed levels during the 
analysis.  The yearly increase in operating costs was then varied for each alternative and 
the resulting NPV recorded.  
Higher operating costs have a negative effect on all three alternatives.  
Alternatives A and B appear to be quite sensitive to changes in operating cost increases.  
The NPV for Alternative A becomes negative at a 2% yearly increase.  Alternative B is 
slightly better, with the NPV becoming negative at a 3% yearly increase.  The NPV for 
Alternative C does not become negative until 5% operating costs yearly increases.  
Alternative C is the least sensitive.  The damping effect of the assumed 12% NPV 
discount rate is seen again.  
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TABLE 5-4 Sensitivity Analysis for Operating Cost –  
Yearly Increase for Alternatives A, B, and C 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis
Variable
A B C
0.0% 1.4 2.5 1.4
1.0% 0.7 1.9 1.3
2.0% (0.6) 1.0 1.1
3.0% (2.8) (0.5) 0.9
4.0% (5.9) (3.5) 0.4
5.0% (10.0) (7.7) (0.3)
6.0% (15.7) (13.3) (1.5)
7.0% (23.5) (21.1) (3.0)
Sensitivity Analysis
Change in Net Present Value (Billions)
Option
Operating Cost - Yearly Increase
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5.3.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis for Offset Payments for Low-Income Users  
A sensitivity analysis comparing yearly increases in offset payments for low-
income users and net present value is shown in Table 5-5.  Both tabular and graphical 
representations are provided.  All other variables were held constant at their assumed 
levels during the analysis.  The yearly increase in offset payments for low-income users 
was then varied for each alternative and the resulting NPV recorded.  
The result shows NPV to be fairly insensitive to changes in the level of offset 
payments for all alternatives.  Alternatives A and B again shows more sensitivity than 
Alternative C.  Alternative A has a negative NPV for all offset payment percentages.  All 
alternatives show declines in NPV as the percentage of revenue being used for offset 
payment is increased; however, the impact of these increases does not appear to be 
dramatic.  
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TABLE 5-5 Sensitivity Analysis for Offset Payments for 
 Low-Income Users for Alternatives A, B, and C 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis
Variable
A B C
0.0% (0.6) 2.6 1.4
2.0% (0.8) 2.5 1.4
4.0% (1.0) 2.3 1.3
6.0% (1.2) 2.2 1.3
8.0% (1.3) 2.0 1.2
10.0% (1.6) 1.9 1.1
12.0% (1.8) 1.7 1.1
14.0% (2.0) 1.6 1.0
16.0% (2.2) 1.4 1.0
Option
Offset Payment for Low Income Users - Yearly Increase
Sensitivity Analysis
Change in Net Present Value (Billions)
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5.3.2.6 Sensitivity Analysis for Capital Expenditures 
 
A sensitivity analysis comparing capital expenditures and net present value is 
shown in Table 5-6.  All other variables were held constant at their assumed levels during 
the analysis.  The yearly increase in capital expenditures was then varied for each 
alternative and the resulting NPV recorded.  Numerical analysis alone is provided.   
Graphical analysis was not appropriate in this case, because of the different 
methods of measurement used in the alternatives.  Alternative A uses a yearly capital 
expenditure while Alternatives B and C use two lump sum payments in years 0 and 30 for 
capital expenditure making meaningful graphical representation unwieldy.   
Even without graphical representation, the amount of capital expenditure appears 
to be quite insensitive with regard to changes in NPV.  Increasing capital expenditure 
does not dramatically impact the NPV in any of the alternatives. 
 
TABLE 5-6 Sensitivity Analysis for Capital Expenditures 
for Alternatives A, B, and C 
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5.3.2.7 Sensitivity Analysis for the Bond or Private Sector Debt Instrument Rate 
 
A sensitivity analysis comparing yearly increases in municipal bond or private 
sector debt instrument rate and net present value is shown in Table 5-7.  Both tabular and 
graphical representations are provided.  All other variables were held constant at their 
assumed levels during the analysis.  The yearly increase in municipal bond or private 
sector debt instrument rate was then varied for each alternative and the resulting NPV 
recorded.  
Alternative A appears to be very sensitive to changes, which is expected, given 
the yearly operating cost shortfalls assumed and the costs associated with the debt 
instruments required to cover such shortfalls.  Alternatives B and C are quite insensitive 
to changes in the bond or debt instrument rate, because they do not assume operating cost 
shortfalls.  Debt instruments are required for capital expenditure, but not to cover yearly 
operating costs.  The result is a strong insensitivity with regard to NPV for Alternatives B 
and C because, relative to Alternative A, few debt instruments are needed.  
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TABLE 5-7 Sensitivity Analysis for Municipal Bond or  
Private Sector Debt Instrument Rate for Alternatives A, B, and C 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis
Number Variable
A B C
4.0% (0.5) 1.9 1.4
6.0% (0.7) 1.9 1.4
7.0% (0.8) 1.9 1.4
8.0% (0.9) 1.9 1.4
9.0% (1.0) 1.8 1.4
10.0% (1.1) 1.8 1.4
11.0% (1.3) 1.8 1.4
12.0% (1.4) 1.8 1.4
14.0% (1.6) 1.8 1.4
16.0% (1.9) 1.8 1.4
Sensitivity Analysis
Change in Net Present Value (Billions)
Option
Municipal Bond or Private Sector Debt Rate
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5.3.2.8 Sensitivity Analysis for the Discount Rate - Calculation of NPV 
 
A sensitivity analysis comparing yearly increases in the discount rate used for the 
calculation of net present value and net present value is shown in Table 5-8.  Both tabular 
and graphical representations are given.  All other variables were held constant at their 
assumed levels during the analysis.  The yearly increase in the discount rate used for the 
calculation of net present value was then varied for each alternative and the resulting 
NPV recorded.  
Alternative C has the highest NPV when identical discount rates are applied.  For 
example, when a 3% discount rate is applied to both Alternatives B and C, the NPV for 
Alternative C is more than twice that of Alternative B.  This larger NPV reflects 
Alternative C’s lower operating costs, lower capital expenditures, and lack of an offset 
payment for low-income users.   
However, that type of comparison can be misleading.  Using a 3% discount rate 
for Alternative C does not accurately reflect the reality of the private sector.   
A 12% discount rate better reflects these realities.  
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TABLE 5-8 Sensitivity Analysis, for Discount Rate Used for the  
Calculation of Net Present Value for Alternatives A, B, and C 
 
  
Sensitivity An lysis
Number Variable
A B C
3.0% (1.3) 3.4 7.2
4.0% (0.9) 2.5 5.6
5.0% (0.6) 1.9 4.4
6.0% (0.4) 1.4 3.6
8.0% (0.2) 0.9 2.5
10.0% 0.0 0.6 1.8
12.0% 0.0 0.4 1.4
14.0% 0.1 0.3 1.2
16.0% 0.1 0.2 1.0
18.0% 0.1 0.2 0.8
20.0% 0.1 0.2 0.7
Option
Discount Rate Used for Calculation of Net Present Value
Sensitivity Analysis
Change in Net Present Value (Billions)
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5.3.2.9 Sensitivity Analysis Summary  
Both the cash flow diagrams and the sensitivity analysis show that the toll 
revenue increases assumed for Alternative A are below the minimum needed to cover 
operating costs over the 50-year period of analysis.  Improvements in other revenue and 
operating costs may slow the annual operating cost shortfalls; however, without higher 
toll revenue increases, this alternative cannot create a positive NPV.  If this alternative is 
pursued at the assumed rate of yearly toll revenue increase, other funds will be required 
to cover the anticipated shortfalls. 
Alternative B has the highest NPV of the three alternatives ($1.9 billion) and from 
a monetary and monetizable perspective seems to provide the best balance of the three 
alternatives for four reasons.    First, Alternative B increases toll revenues and other 
revenue at the same rate as the private concessionaire in Alternative C.  Second, 
Alternative B has 1% lower operating costs than Alternative A, which helps boost NPV.  
The sensitivity analyses show that the additional 1% operating cost savings assumed for 
Alternative C do not appear to increase NPV significantly over those of Alternative B.  
Third, the 5% discount rate assumed is considerably lower than the 12% assumed for 
Alternative C and the sensitivity analyses shows that difference in assumptions leads to a 
significant difference in NPV.  Fourth, Alternative B is the only one that applies 10% of 
toll revenue as an offset payment for low-income users.  
At $1.4 billion, the lump sum payment for Alternative C is somewhat lower than 
that of Alternative B.  The lower sensitivity seen in Alternative C to changes in most of 
the variables tested, also has an appearance of stability.  Alternative C is also the only 
alternative that provides the full NPV amount as a lump sum payment in year 0.  For 
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these three reasons, Alternative C could be seen as a fairly attractive alternative.  
However, that appearance is misleading.  The relative insensitivity, in many instances, is 
created by the use of a higher discount rate.  This higher rate dampens the NPV by 
returning more of any increased revenue to the concessionaire.  The higher discount rate 
helps reduce uncertainty to the concessionaire, by lowering the NPV.   
Another somewhat hidden factor in the sensitivity analysis is that the lump sum 
payment calculations do not include existing debt service.  The private sector 
concessionaire will not take over existing public sector debt service payments.  When the 
existing toll road debt is factored into the lump sum payment calculation to create NPV, 
the resulting NPV is $-0.8 billion.   Both the higher discount rate and the need for the 
public sector lessee to cover existing toll road debt with the lump sum payment make this 
a much less attractive alternative than shown in the sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.4 Method 2: The Non-Monetizable Factor Method  
The next step in the conceptual DSS process is to complete the Non-Monetizable 
Factor Method.  Surveys were completed for all five of the decision makers based on the 
assumptions made with regard to their stated objectives.  The results were then calculated 
and analyzed.  
5.4.1 Completed Surveys  
Completed surveys are shown in Figures 5-4 to 5-8.  
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FIGURE 5-4 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Statements 
Responses for Decision Maker 1 
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FIGURE 5-5 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Statements 
Responses for Decision Maker 2 
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FIGURE 5-6 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Statements 
Responses for Decision Maker 3 
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FIGURE 5-7 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Statements 
Responses for Decision Maker 4 
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FIGURE 5-8 Non-Monetizable Factor Method Statements 
Responses for Decision Maker 5 
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5.4.2 Method 2 Results and Analysis  
Sections 5.4.2.1 to 5.4.2.5 calculate and discuss the results for each decision 
maker.  Table 5-8 Method 2 – Analysis summarizes both the response sets and the 
calculated weights for the five decision makers.    
5.4.2.1 Calculated Results for Decision Maker 1  
For Decision Maker 1, the responses to statements 1, 2 and 3 respectively were 3, 
3, and 3 (response set 3-3-3).  The points assigned to each statement were respectively, 
20, 40, and 40 (See Figure 5-4).  The weight associated with that response set and point 
assignment is then calculated as: 
W(E(A)-R1) = |[(1-3)*20] + [(1-3)*40] + [(1-3)*40]| / 2 = 100 
W(E(A)-R1) = 100 
The calculated weight of 100 places the decision maker on Alternative C.  The 
response set of 3-3-3 is known to be representative of Alternative C: Public-Private 
Partnership Organization and also places the decision maker on Alternative C.  For 
decision maker 1, there is no disconnect in the results.  Alternative C is the Method 2 
result.    
5.4.2.2 Calculated Results for Decision Maker 2 
 
For Decision Maker 2, the response set was 2-2-2 and the points assigned to each 
question were 50, 0, and 50 (See Figure 5-5).  The weight associated with that response 
set and point assignment is then calculated as: 
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W(E(A)-R2) = |[(1-2)*50] + [(1-2)* 0] + [(1-2)*50]| / 2 = 50 
W(E(A)-R2) = 50 
The calculated weight of 50 places the decision maker on Alternative B.  The 
response set of 2-2-2 is known to be representative of Alternative B: Public-Public 
Partnership Organization and also places the decision maker on Alternative B.  For 
decision maker 2, there is no disconnect in the results.  Alternative B is the Method 2 
result.   
 
5.4.2.3 Calculated Results for Decision Maker 3 
 
For Decision Maker 3, the response set was 1-1-3 and the points assigned to each 
question were 20-60-20 (See Figure 5-6). The weight associated with that response set 
and point assignment is then calculated as: 
W(E(A)-R3) = |[(1-1)*20] + [(1-1)*60] + [(1-3)*20]| / 2 = 20 
W(E(A)-R3) = 20 
The calculated weight of 20 places the decision maker near Alternative A.  The 
response set of 1-1-3 also places the decision maker near to Alternative A.  For decision 
maker 3, although the result is not quite as clear-cut as for decision makers 1 and 3, there 
does not appear to be a disconnect in the results.  The Method 2 result appears to be 
Alternative A.   
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5.4.2.4 Calculated Results for Decision Maker 4 
 
For Decision Maker 4, the response set was 3-3-1 and the points assigned to each 
question were 30-40-30 (See Figure 5-7). The weight associated with that response set 
and point assignment is then calculated as: 
W(E(A)-R4) = |[(1-3)*30] + [(1-3)*40] + [(1-1)*30]| / 2 = 70 
W(E(A)-R4) = 70 
The calculated weight of 70 places the decision maker between Alternative B and 
C and slightly closer to Alternative B.  The response set of 3-3-1 places the decision 
maker between Alternatives B and C, however fairly close to Alternative C.  For decision 
maker 4, there appears to be a disconnect in the results.  The calculated weight indicates 
some preference for Alternative B, while the response set indicates a quite strong 
preference for Alternative C.  The Method 2 result is that a disconnect does exist between 
the calculated weight and the response set.  A hybrid alternative needs to be created to 
help bridge that disconnect.  
5.4.2.5 Calculated Results for Decision Maker 5  
For Decision Maker 5, the response set was 1-2-3 and the points assigned to each 
question were 45-10-45 (See Figure 5-8). The weight associated with that response set 
and point assignment is then calculated as: 
W(E(A)-R5) = |[(1-1)*45] + [(1-2)*10] + [(1-3)*45]| / 2 = 50 
W(E(A)-R5 = 50 
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The calculated weight of 50 places the decision maker on Alternative B.  The 
response set of 1-2-3 places the decision maker between Alternatives A and B, however 
relatively closer to Alternative A.  For decision maker 5, there appears to be a disconnect 
in the results.  The calculated weight indicates a direct preference for Alternative B, while 
the response set indicates a preference for Alternative B.  The Method 2 result is that a 
disconnect does exist between the calculated weight and the response set.  A hybrid 
alternative needs to be created to help bridge that disconnect.  
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TABLE 5-9 Method 2 Analysis –Non-Monetizable Factor Method  
 
 
  
   125 
5.5 Create Two Hybrid Alternatives for Decision Makers 4 and 5   
The Method 2 results indicate that the development of two additional alternatives 
could help close the potential disconnect in perceptions found for decision makers 4 and 
5.  Therefore, the Method 1 analysis will be altered to include two additional cash flow 
diagrams for two new “hybrid” organizational alternatives.  
 
5.5.1 Alternative D – The Hybrid Public-Private Partnership Organization   
 Alternative D: Hybrid Public-Private Partnership Organization is designed to fall 
between core organizational Alternatives B and C.  The alternative retains all of the 
organizational components of Alternative C and the existing toll road is still leased to a private sector concessionaire.  However, yearly increases in toll revenue are reduced 
from 2.0% per year to 0.5% per year.  Yearly toll revenue increases are reduced to the 
same nominal rate assumed for Alternative A and are therefore significantly reduced. 
Assumptions with regard to increases in operating efficiency are kept the same as 
Alternative C.  Other assumptions and calculations used to determine lump sum payment, 
including the 12% discount rate, are also the same as for Alternative C.    
Tables A-7 and A-8 in Appendix A are the calculation sheets for Alternative D 
and Figure 5-9 shows the cash flow diagram for Alternative D. 
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FIGURE 5-9 Cash Flow Diagram for Alternative D: Hybrid Public-Private 
Partnership Organization (Hybrid) (Bruun) 
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5.5.2 Alternative E – The Hybrid Public Organization  
 
Alternative E: Hybrid Public Organization is designed to fall between core 
organizational Alternatives A and B.  The alternative retains all of the organizational 
components of Alternative A; however, yearly increases in toll revenue are raised from 
0.5% per year to 2.0% per year.  Alternative E generates toll revenue at the same rate as 
Alternative C: Public-Private Partnership Organization and therefore toll revenue is 
increased significantly.   
Assumptions with regard to operating efficiency remain the same.  Other 
assumptions and calculations used to determine NPV, including the 5% discount rate, are 
also the same as for Alternative A.  
Tables A-9 and A-10 in Appendix A are the calculation sheets for Alternative E 
and Figure 5-10 shows the cash flow diagram for Alternative E. 
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FIGURE 5-10 Cash Flow Diagram for Alternative E: Hybrid Public Organization 
(Hybrid) (Bruun) 
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5.5.3  Results and Analysis for Alternatives D and E 
 
Table 5-10 shows the updated Summary of Methods with the hybrid alternatives 
added and the Method 2 results adjusted.  Note that the addition of two new hybrid 
alternatives allows for further clarification of results.   
Alternative D: Hybrid Public-Private Partnership Organization appears to better 
meet the objectives of decision maker 4, the Chair of State Senate Transportation Committee.  The Senator states a desire to avoid unpopular stances.  Raising tolls, even 
through a public-private partnership, would likely be unpopular.  Alternative D offers a 
public-private partnership solution that potentially uses reductions in operating costs to 
help meet funding needs.  
 The downside of Alternative D is that the lump sum payment offered does not 
cover existing toll road debt and results in an NPV of $-1.1 billion.  Other funding 
sources would be need to be investigated. 
Alternative E: Hybrid Public Organization appears to better meet the objectives of 
decision maker 3, the Chief Engineer.  The Chief’s objectives were to keep the existing 
organization in place and to identify defensive strategies to use against proposed P3 
alternatives.  Alternative E results in an NPV of $1.5 billion, which should provide 
support for the Chief’s objectives and efforts. 
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TABLE 5-10 Summary of Methods – Monetary and Monetizable Factor Method 
and Non-Monetizable Factor Method Incorporating 2 Hybrid Alternatives 
 
  
   131 
 
5.6 Summary of Results  
 
The illustrative example demonstrates that the conceptual DSS process is able to 
present information of a monetary, monetizable and non-monetizable nature, in an 
organized manner, such that, it can be reviewed easily by decision-makers.  The 
information also can be used to initiate discussion among stakeholders and/or the general 
public with regard to the benefits and costs of the P3 alternatives being considered. 
One unanticipated result in the illustrative example relates to Alternative E.  The 
hybrid option showed that a 1.5% yearly increase in Alternative A toll revenue  
(0.5% to 2.0%) increased the NPV to a positive $1.5 billion, which is in contrast to the 
NPV of $-0.6 billion for Alternative A.  Alternative E created enough revenue to cover 
yearly operating cost shortfalls, pay off the $2.2 billion of existing toll road debt over a 
30-year period and the cover debt service required for capital expenditures.  The existing 
public sector organization was not changed in any way, except for the seemingly small 
yearly toll increase.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(RESEARCH APPROACH – TASK 10) 
 
6.1 The Research Contribution 
 
The research contribution is threefold.  The first research contribution is the 
development of a conceptual DSS process, which gathers information of a monetary, 
monetizable and non-monetizable nature.  That process then organizes it in a manner, 
which can be used to summarize and present decision-maker with major results.  The 
information can also be used to initiate discussion among stakeholders or the general 
public with regard to the benefits and costs of the P3 alternatives proposed.  The 
conceptual DSS process has the potential to provide transparency for the general public 
and other stakeholders. 
The second research contribution is confirmation that non-monetary and non-
monetizable variables are an important component of the P3 decision process.  That 
finding led to the development of Method 2, which is an analytical tool for such variables.  
  The third research contribution is the identification of difficult P3 terminology and 
the taking of several first steps toward defining such terms.  The research attempted to 
bridge a gap between the fields of Finance, Transportation Engineering and Decision 
Theory and quickly ran into confusion with regard to terminology such as “earnings, 
customer service, user costs, discount rates, net present value, debt, safety and risk.”  The 
conceptual DSS process attempted to define these variables; however, more research is 
needed to define remaining terminology before communication between stakeholders can 
be clear and discussion truly transparent.  
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6.2 The Research Theory - Conclusions  
The research theory was developed as a result of literature review findings that 
previous P3 existing toll road agreements in the United States appeared to have been 
assessed using only lump sum monetary terms.  These analyses used financial methods to 
determine the lump sum payment offered and little else.  In addition, private sector 
bidders and not public sector entities performed the analyses.  Both of these findings lead 
to questions regarding the possibility of P3 analysis using a broader economic analysis 
approach, including cost/benefit methods, which are more familiar to the transportation 
field and also have historically given a more complete picture of the decision to be made.  
Testing the theory required identifying P3 variable groups, as well as, core P3 
alternatives.  Two analytical methods were then developed, which weigh the value of 
different variables against the stated objectives.  The methods are not complex and much 
effort was made toward making them simple to use.  Development efforts showed that 
increasing complexity did not necessarily increase accuracy or usefulness, particularly for 
the non-monetizable variables.  
The first analytical method is Method 1: The Monetary and Monetizable Factor 
Method, which uses cash flow diagrams to analyze monetary and monetizable variables.  
These diagrams visually show the contributions of each variable and allow the decision 
maker to consider the relative importance of all monetary and monetizable factors during 
the decision process.  They add depth beyond simply lump sum factors, and transparency 
in that relative importance of variables can be seen.  The diagrams capture all Method 1 
factors with one single, straightforward method. 
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The second analytical method is Method 2: The Non-Monetizable Factor Method, 
which has demonstrated that non-monetizable factors are a significant component of the 
P3 decision process.  Method 2 further demonstrated that non-monetizable factors can be 
used to both provide insight into stakeholder motives and to aid in identifying hybrid 
alternatives that require additional investigation during the decision process.  
The illustrative example presented in Chapter 5 then tested both of the analytical 
methods using a fictional toll road and five fictional decision makers.  The results were in 
some ways expected and in at least one way, surprising.  The results were expected, in that 
the results for three of the decision makers very clearly indicated a preferred alternative.  
Surprising, in that a 1.5% yearly increase in toll revenue, over that assumed for 
Alternative A, resulted in a positive NPV for Alternative E with no other changes to the 
existing toll road organization.  
In the end, the illustrative example confirmed the complexity associated with such 
decisions, but also demonstrated, with some clarity, that alternative P3 organizations can 
be objectively assessed in terms of their major benefits and costs.  Therefore, based on the 
research conducted herein, the conclusion is that the stated research theory can generally 
be accepted as true.  
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6.3 The Research Hypotheses - Conclusions 
 
6.3.1 Hypothesis 1: 
 
“Some of the benefits of each alternative can be assessed in monetary terms.”  
These variables are seen in the form of revenue and other benefits that are expressed in 
monetary terms.  As discussed in the literature synthesis, monetary variables appear to 
have been the primary factors used to determine benefit in the determination of lump sum 
payment offered in previous United States P3 concession agreements.  The use of cash 
flow diagrams allowed for the effective incorporation of these benefits into the decision 
process and therefore, based on the research conducted herein, this hypothesis 1 can 
generally be accepted as true.    
 
6.3.2 Hypothesis 2: 
 
“Some of the costs of each alternative can be assessed in monetary terms.”  These 
variables are seen in the form of operating costs, debt service and other costs that are 
monetary expressed in monetary terms.  As discussed in the literature synthesis, monetary 
variables appear to have been the primary factors used to determine cost in the 
determination of lump sum payment offered in previous United States P3 concession 
agreements.  The use of cash flow diagrams allowed for the effective incorporation of 
these costs into the decision process and therefore, based on the research conducted 
herein, hypothesis 2 can generally be accepted as true.    
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6.3.3 Hypothesis 3: 
 
“Some of the benefits of each alternative can be assessed in non-monetary, but 
monetizable terms.”  One example of this type of variable is seen in the form of safety 
improvements.  The impact of these improvements is often expressed in terms of crash 
reduction or lives saved, but not typically expressed in monetary terms.  However, a 
monetary value can be assigned with some certainty to these typically non-monetary 
values.  The use of cash flow diagrams allowed for the effective incorporation of these 
non-monetary, but monetizable variables into the decision process and therefore, based on 
the research conducted herein, hypothesis 3 can generally be accepted as true.    
 
6.3.4 Hypothesis 4: 
 
“Some of the costs of each alternative can be assessed in non-monetary, but 
monetizable terms.”  An example of this type of variable can be seen in the form of travel 
delay.  The impact of this delay often expressed in terms of hours of time lost, but are not 
typically expressed in monetary terms.  However, a monetary value can be assigned with 
some certainty to this non-monetary value.  The use of cash flow diagrams allows for the 
effective incorporation of such non-monetary, but monetizable variables into the decision 
process and therefore, based on the research conducted herein, hypothesis 4 can generally 
be accepted as true.    
 
  
   137 
 
6.3.5 Hypothesis 5: 
 
“Some of the benefits and costs of each alternative can be assessed in non-
monetary, non-monetizable, but measurable terms.”  Some measurable variables cannot be 
assigned a per unit monetary factor with any level of confidence with regard to the 
accuracy of the results.  An example might be the concept of travel time reliability.  This 
concept might be measured, but assigning a monetary value to the measurement might 
prove difficult.  Method 2: The Non-monetary Factor Method allowed for the effective 
incorporation of such non-monetary, non-monetizable, but measurable variables into the 
decision process and therefore, based on the research conducted herein, hypothesis 5 can 
generally be accepted as true.    
 
6.3.6 Hypothesis 6: 
 
“Some of the benefits and costs of each alternative can be assessed in non-
monetary, non-monetizable, and non-measurable terms.”  Some variables simply cannot 
be measured.  An example might be the level of importance associated with the deferment 
of a tax increase.  The concept could be very important to the decision process; however, 
assigning a numerical measurement to that level of importance might prove difficult.  
Method 2 allowed for the effective incorporation of such non-monetary, non-monetizable, 
and non-measurable variables into the decision process and therefore, based on the 
research conducted herein, hypothesis 6 can generally be accepted as true.  
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6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The two analytical methods presented in this paper are a first step.  They provide 
useful tools for the conceptual DSS framework; however, more research is needed before 
a fully functional set of analytical methods can be developed.  The following are three 
areas of potential research interest and benefit. 
 
6.4.1 Further Define Monetary and Monetizable Factors 
 
The identification and definition of monetary and monetizable factors for 
inclusion in Method 1 will add to the scope of costs and benefits considered during the P3 
decision process.  The key variables currently included in the conceptual DSS framework 
need to be further defined and new factors need to be identified and added to the 
analytical method.   
The question of which variables can be measured and monetized using reasonable 
assumptions and which cannot be assigned monetary value, even though they are 
measurable, is a challenge that remains.  These variables need to be investigated, defined, 
and incorporated into Method 1.  
 
6.4.2 Further Define Non-Monetizable Factors 
 
The identification and definition of non-monetizable factors for inclusion in 
Method 2 will also add to the scope of the costs and benefits considered during the P3 
decision process.  These non-monetizable factors could be added to Method 2 through the 
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expansion of existing statements, the addition of new statements, or some other 
refinement of the method.   
 
6.4.3 Further Explore Challenging Terminology and Concepts 
 
 During the research, certain terminology and concepts were found to be a 
challenge, in that their definition varied from stakeholder to stakeholder.  Attempts to 
clearly define these terms and concepts and then include them in the analytical methods 
were met, in some cases, with much frustration.  Examples of these terms include: 
• Value 
• Effectiveness 
• Efficiency 
• Customer service 
• Risk 
• Iterative 
• Nominal  Examples of concepts include: 
• Impacts on Highway Safety when a Private Corporation Operates the Toll Road 
• Impacts on Traffic Delay if Traffic Demand is not Assumed Inelastic 
• Fundamentals Behind the Role of Government 
• The Challenges Associated with Measuring User Specific Costs and Benefits 
• The Role of Equity Among Users 
• The Role of Dillon’s Rule in P3 Agreements  
Future research could concentrate on defining these terms and concepts and their 
role with respect to the DSS process, with the goal of including them in the analytical 
methods.   
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APPENDIX  
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES  
A.1 Calculation Sheets for Cash Flow Diagrams 
 
TABLE A-1 Calculation Sheet 1 for Alternative A: Public Organization 
Cash Flow Diagram 
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TABLE A-2 Calculation Sheet 2 for Alternative A: Public Organization 
Cash Flow Diagram 
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TABLE A-3 Calculation Sheet 1 for Alternative B:  
Public–Public Partnership Organization Cash Flow Diagram 
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TABLE A-4 Calculation Sheet 2 for Alternative B:  
Public–Public Partnership Organization Cash Flow Diagram 
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TABLE A-5 Calculation Sheet 1 for Alternative C:  
Public–Private Partnership Organization Cash Flow Diagram  
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TABLE A-6 Calculation Sheet 2 for Alternative C:  
Public–Private Partnership Organization Cash Flow Diagram 
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TABLE A-7 Calculation Sheet 1 for Alternative D:  
Hybrid Public-Private Partnership Organization Cash Flow Diagram 
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TABLE A-8 Calculation Sheet 2 for Alternative D:  
Hybrid Public-Private Partnership Organization Cash Flow Diagram  
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TABLE A-9 Calculation Sheet 1 for Alternative E: Hybrid Public Organization 
Cash Flow Diagram 
 
 
  
   149 
TABLE A-10 Calculation Sheet 2 for Alternative E: Hybrid Public Organization 
Cash Flow Diagram 
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A.2 Summary Sheets for Sensitivity Analysis 
 
TABLE A-11 Sensitivity Analysis, Alternatives A, B, and C 
Sheet 1 
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TABLE A-12 Sensitivity Analysis, Alternatives A, B, and C 
Sheet 2 
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